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INTRODUCTION

William Rehnquist was first appointed to the Supreme Court by
President Nixon in 1973. In 1986, President Reagan nominated
Justice Rehnquist to replace Warren Burger as Chief Justice and the
Senate confirmed the appointment that year. After nineteen years as
Chief Justice, Rehnquist passed away on September 3, 2005. In light
of the loss to the legal community, it seems appropriate to review the
federal tax decisions of the Rehnquist Court.
During William Rehnquist's nineteen terms as Chief Justice, the
Court granted certiorari or heard appeals in approximately sixty
federal tax cases.' Of these, twenty-three involve procedural matters

" F. Ladson Boyle is the Charles E. Simon Professor of Federal
Law at the
University of South Carolina School of Law. He wishes to thank Alyson Campbell
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such as statutes of limitations, lien priority, bankruptcy, and Tax
Court rules; 2 two decisions involve insurance company taxation;3 two

involve taxation of multinational businesses;4 and four involve FICA
taxes.' The remaining twenty-eight decisions address statutes that
determine federal income, gift, and estate taxes or consider the
constitutionality of those statutes.6

and Greg Flowers for their editing and research assistance and Nancy Shealy for her
secretarial support.
One decision, South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988), was heard in
original jurisdiction. In addition, this total does not include decisions where the
controlling law is contained in the Internal Revenue Code (Code) unless either the
United States or the Commissioner is a litigant. See, e.g., Rousey v. Jacoway, 125 S.
Ct. 1561 (2005) (allowing exclusion from bankruptcy estate of assets held in individual
retirement accounts governed by the Code). Finally, this list does not include state
tax cases or the unique tax cases involving Native Americans.
2 Ballard v. Commissioner, 125 S. Ct. 1270 (2005); United States
v. Craft, 535
U.S. 274 (2002); Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43 (2002); Baral v. United States,
528 U.S. 431 (2000); United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517 (1998); United
States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997); United States v. Jose, 519 U.S. 54 (1996);
United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213 (1996);
United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996); Commissioner v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235
(1996); United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995); United States v. McDermott,
507 U.S. 447 (1993); Bufferd v. Commissioner, 506 U.S. 523 (1993); Church of
Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9 (1992); Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503
U.S. 47 (1992); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992); Freytag v.
Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991); Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53
(1990); United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990); United States v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 493 U.S. 132 (1989); Commissioner v. Asphalt
Products Co., 482 U.S. 117 (1987); Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3 (1987).
3 Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U.S. 382 (1998); Colonial Am.
Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 491 U.S. 244 (1989).
4 Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437 (2003); United States v. Int'l Bus.
Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843 (1996).
5 United States v. Fior D'Italia, Inc., 536 U.S. 238 (2002); United States
v.
Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001); United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S.
200 (2001); Jersey Shore State Bank v. United States, 479 U.S. 442 (1987).
6 Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826 (2005); United Dominion Indus., Inc.
v.
United States, 532 U.S. 822 (2001); Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206 (2001); Drye
v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999); Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93
(1997); O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996); Commissioner v. Schleier, 515
U.S. 323 (1995); United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994); United States v. Irvine,
511 U.S. 224 (1994); Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546
(1993); United States v. Hill, 506 U.S. 546 (1993); Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S.
168 (1993); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992); INDOPCO v. Commissioner,
503 U.S. 79 (1992); United States v. Centennial Sav. Bank FSB, 499 U.S. 573 (1991);
Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991); Portland Golf Club v.
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This article examines those opinions that address substantive
provisions of domestic federal tax law.' Because of the number of
decisions involved, it is not possible to provide a detailed analysis of

each majority decision, much less a detailed analysis of each
concurring or dissenting opinion.
Nevertheless, this article
summarizes the twenty-eight decisions briefly and the current status of
each ruling.8 At the end of each case summary is a reference to other

literature that has considered the Court's decision in greater detail. 9
Most of the opinions reviewed may be divided into a limited

number of subject matters. These include the constitutional cases,
income cases, deduction cases, corporate tax related cases, and estate
and gift tax cases. Within these categories, it is possible to subdivide

topics. For example, some of the deduction cases may be grouped as
charitable cases and as deduction/capitalization cases. However, the

author's attempt to categorize cases, is less than perfect as this article
reveals. In particular, some cases involve the alternative minimum tax
which raises deduction or income issues. Cases involving income tax
accounting could be classified as such, but instead this article discusses

those cases on the basis of whether the result affects the time an item
of income is reported or an expense is deducted.
II.

OVERVIEW OBSERVATIONS

First, when the Court agrees to hear a tax case, it is generally not
good news for a taxpayer. The government has been victorious in

Commissioner, 497 U.S. 154 (1990); Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472 (1990);
Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 203 (1990); Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726 (1989);
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988); United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485
U.S. 351 (1988); Commissioner v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340 (1988); Ark. Best Corp. v.
Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988); Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89 (1987); United
States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239 (1987); Commissioner v. Groetzinger,
480 U.S. 23 (1987).
7 The choice to limit the scope of this article is a practical choice and does not
necessarily reflect the relative importance of the decisions.
8 In addition to the twenty-eight Rehnquist Court opinions
reviewed, this
article reviews two opinions issued by the Court while Rehnquist was still an associate
justice: Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305 (1982), and United States v. Am. Bar
Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986). Inclusion of these decisions is necessary for placing
the later Rehnquist Court decisions in context.
9 The reference to the literature is not complete because many of the
Court's
decisions have been discussed extensively by commentators, but rather is a sampling
of applicable articles.
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nineteen of the twenty-eight decisions'0 and the taxpayer has prevailed

in only nine." The Court affirmed about the same number of lower
court decisions as it reversed for the government. The same affirm-toreverse ratio is true for taxpayer victories and losses. Because nearly
all issues heard by the Court resolve conflicts among the circuits, it
seems insignificant whether the Court is affirming or reversing the
circuit court in a particular case.
Second, when a relatively long-term view is taken of the Supreme
Court's tax jurisprudence, one pattern that emerges is the Court's
willingness to venture into various areas of tax law and its subsequent
willingness to fine tune or provide additional guidance when related

10 Wins for the government in which the Court affirmed the lower court's ruling,
in part or in its entirety, include:
Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999); O'Gilvie v. United States, 519
U.S. 79 (1996); INDOPCO v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992); United
States v. Centennial Sav. Bank FSB, 499 U.S. 573 (1991); Portland Golf
Club v. Commissioner, 497 U.S. 154 (1990); Davis v. United States, 495
U.S. 472 (1990); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); South
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988); Ark. Best Corp. v. Commissioner,
485 U.S. 212 (1988). Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305 (1982), is
discussed in this article, but is a pre-Rehnquist Court decision for the
Government that is not included in the totals.
Wins for the government in which the Court reversed the lower court include:
Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826 (2005); Commissioner v. Schleier,
515 U.S. 323 (1995); United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994); United
States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224 (1994); Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S.
168 (1993); United States v. Hill, 506 U.S. 546 (1993); United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992); United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S.
351 (1988); Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89 (1987); United States v. Gen.
United States v. Am. Bar
Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239 (1987).
Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986), is discussed in this article, but is a preRehnquist Court decision for the government that is not included in the
totals.
" Wins for the taxpayer in which the Court affirmed the lower court's ruling in
part or in its entirety include:
Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93 (1997); Commissioner v.
Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 203 (1990); Commissioner v.
Clark, 489 U.S. 726 (1989); Commissioner v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340 (1988);
Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987).
Wins for the taxpayer in which the Court reversed the lower court include:
Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206 (2001); United Dominion Indus., Inc.
v. United States, 532 U.S. 822 (2001); Newark Morning Ledger Co. v.
United States, 507 U.S. 546 (1993); Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner,
499 U.S. 554 (1991).
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12

issues arise. This trend appears with the damages cases, charitable
cases, and disclaimer cases. Third, on rare occasions, the Supreme
Court has considered constitutional issues concerning tax statutes.
Fourth, the Court almost always grants certiorari in tax cases
rather than hearing a matter as an appeal. Of the cases discussed in
this article, only United States v. Wells Fargo Bank 13 was heard on

appeal; the Court accepted original jurisdiction to hear South Carolina
v. Baker.14 For the cases in which certiorari was granted, nineteen
were based on conflicting opinions by circuit courts, 5 while only seven
were heard because the Court determined the 16issue was significant or
did not otherwise note a conflict in the circuits.
The final and most striking trend that appears is the frequency
with which Congress has dealt with the substantive tax issue either by

the time the Court makes a decision or shortly thereafter. Thus, a
Congressional change in the statutory law moots the Court's opinion.
This has occurred in more than half of the Rehnquist Court tax
decisions. The discussions below include an epilogue for each of the
Court's decisions that describes the ultimate resolution of the issue
the Court addressed.

12

Because the Court is not a static body that closed down completely when

Chief Justice Burger retired and started fresh when Chief Justice Rehnquist was
appointed Chief Justice, a few decisions of the Court announced relatively late by the
Burger Court are relevant. See, for example, United States v. Am. Bar Endowment,
477 U.S. 105 (1986), discussed infra Part VI.
13 See infra notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
15 Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826 (2005); United Dominion Indus.,
Inc. v.

United States, 532 U.S. 822 (2001); Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206 (2001); Drye
v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999); Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93
(1997); O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996); Commissioner v. Schleier, 515
U.S. 323 (1995); United States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224 (1994); Newark Morning Ledger
Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546 (1993); Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168
(1993); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992); INDOPCO v. Commissioner, 503
U.S. 79 (1992); Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991); United
States v. Centennial Sav. Bank FSB, 499 U.S. 573 (1991); Portland Golf Club v.
Commissioner, 497 U.S. 154 (1990); Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472 (1990);
Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light, 493 U.S. 203 (1990); Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680; Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726 (1989);
Commissioner v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340 (1988); Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89
(1987); Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987).
16 United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994); United States v. Hill, 506 U.S.
546 (1993); Ark. Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988); United States v.
Gen. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239 (1987).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

The Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of
federal tax statutes on only three occasions and reached the
constitutional issue only twice. The Court decided two of the cases in
1988 and the third in 1994. The congressional acts were all found to
be constitutional.
A. Estate Tax Exemption for Property Decided

In United States v. Wells FargoBank,17 the Court accepted a direct
appeal from a California District Court that had ruled certain public
housing agency obligations" issued by state and local governments
were exempt from federal estate taxation. The district court relied on
Haffner v. United States,'9 which held that Project Notes were exempt
from the federal estate tax.
Wells Fargo brought two issues before the Court. First, did the
1937 legislation that authorized the housing agency bonds exempt
those bonds from estate taxation? Second, was the 1984 legislation
that attempted to deny refunds for estate taxes already paid on the
agency bonds constitutional? 20
The Court first considered the statutory interpretation issue,
preferring to reach the constitutional issue if, and only if, the Housing
Act of 1937 exempted the bonds from estate taxes. 21 As the Court
noted, section 5(e) of that Act provides: "[Project Notes], including
interest thereon... shall be exempt from all taxation now or hereafter
imposed by the United States." 22 An exemption for estate taxes for
these notes was supported by the 1937 Senate floor debate regarding
the Act. Senator Walsh stated: "[T]he bill gives the public housing
agencies the right to issue tax-exempt bonds, which means they are

17
18

485 U.S. 351 (1988).
The obligations in question were bonds issued by state or local governments

under the Housing Act of 1937. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat.
888.
19 585 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ill. 1984), affd, 757 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1984).
20 See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 641, 98 Stat. 939. In

addition to denying refunds of estate taxes paid on Housing Project Notes, section 641
also repealed any exemption from estate or gift taxes that might apply to decedents
dying after June 19, 1984 or transfers made after that date. Id.
21 United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888.
22 Wells Fargo, 485 U.S. at 355 (alteration in original) (citing the United States
Housing Act of 1937).

458
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free from income tax, surtax, estate, gift, and inheritance taxes., 23 In
addition, Warren Vinton, who became the Chief Economist of the
Housing Authority sometime after the passage of the Housing Act,
commented: "Project Notes were 'exempt from all Federal taxes, not
24
only normal income taxes, but surtax, inheritance tax, and gift tax.'
Notwithstanding the apparent plain meaning of the statutory
language, the unequivocal floor debate, and the understanding of a
key figure in the post-enactment of the statute, the Court found that
the housing notes were not exempt from estate taxes. 25 It dismissed
the statement of the Housing Authority official as untimely and found
that Senator Walsh misspoke when he described the breadth of the
exemption. The Court went on to discount his statement as coming
"in the middle of a long speech, [with] no similar expression..,
to be
26
found in any other legislative debate or document.,
The Court rejected a plain meaning of the statutory language that
"all taxes" means exactly that - all taxes. Instead, the Court
concluded that "all taxes" meant only direct taxes, such as income
taxes, and did not include excise taxes, such as estate taxes. 27 When
Congress intended to exclude property from estate taxes it had been
specific. 2" Having determined that the 1937 Housing Act did not
exempt the bonds from estate taxation, the Court did not reach the
constitutional question of whether Congress could enact this change
retroactively. 29
Epilogue:30 With the Government win affirming the taxability of the
bonds, there has been no Treasury Department or Congressional
response to Wells Fargo. There was, however, as the Court noted,
action by Congress before the Court's decision in Wells Fargoto deny
refunds for estate or gift taxes already paid. The 1984 corrective
legislation also removed the estate and gift exemption on a
prospective basis in all events and the constitutionality of that

23
24

Id. at 358 (citing 81 CONG. REc. 8085 (1937) (statement of Sen. Walsh)).
Id. at 359.

25 Id. at 358.
26

Id.

27

See Wells Fargo,485 U.S. at 359.

2S See id. at 356 (providing one specific example of such legislative drafting).
29

See id. at 359.

30 For further discussion of Wells Fargo,see Katessa Charles, The Elimination of

Estate Tax Exemption for Project Notes: United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 42 TAX
LAW. 423 (1989); Estate and Gift Taxes, 42 TAX LAW. 1243 (1989).
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provision was not before the Court." Thus, the impact of the Court's
decision was quite limited.
B. BearerBonds may be Taxed as Income
32

In South Carolina v. Baker, an action brought in the original

jurisdiction of the Court, South Carolina challenged the
constitutionality of section 310(b)(1) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA).33

That section amended

Internal Revenue Code (Code) section 103 to add subsection (j)(1),
which provided that state and local bond issues are not exempt from
federal income taxes unless issued as registered bonds.34
At

Congressional hearings concerning the amendment to section 103, an
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury had testified that bearer bonds
could be used to avoid income taxes as well as gift and estate taxes.35

In response to this problem, Congress enacted TEFRA section 310 to
require all bonds with a maturity greater than one year to be issued in
registered form. Thus, the denial of an income tax exemption for
unregistered state and local bonds was just one aspect of the
legislation.
In South Carolina v. Baker, South Carolina raised a Tenth
Amendment argument, asserting that TEFRA section 310 exceeded

Congress's authority to regulate the states. The Court found that
31
32
33

Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, § 641, 98 Stat. 939.
485 U.S. 505 (1988).
Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 310(b)(1), 96 Stat. 324, 596.

34 Id. Before TEFRA, state and local bonds could be issued in bearer form, that

is issued without a registered owner. The Court explained the difference in registered
and bearer bonds:
These two types of bonds differ in the mechanisms used for transferring
ownership and making payments. Ownership of a registered bond is
recorded on a central list, and a transfer of record ownership requires
entering the change on that list. The record owner automatically receives
interest payments by check or electronic transfer of funds from the issuer's
paying agent. Ownership of a bearer bond, in contrast, is presumed from
possession and is transferred by physically handing over the bond. The
bondowner obtains interest payments by presenting bond coupons to a
bank that in turn presents the coupons to the issuer's paying agent.
Baker, 485 U.S. at 508 (citation omitted).
35 See Baker, 485 U.S. at 509 (citing Tax Compliance Act of 1982 and Related
Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 6300 Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th
Cong. 35 (1982) (statement of John Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Tax Policy)).
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argument to be unpersuasive and held that the Tenth Amendment is
implicated only when the political process fails; it does not
"[authorize] courts to second-guess the substantive basis for
congressional legislation. ,,36
Next, South Carolina contended that even if the statute were
constitutional, TEFRA section 310 "violate[d] the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity because it impose[d] a tax on the
interest earned on a state bond."37 This stance was supported by the
Supreme Court's 1895 decision in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 38 which the Baker Court noted had "held that any interest earned

on a state bond was immune from federal taxation., 39 The Court
responded to this argument by expressly stating that "subsequent law
has overruled the holding in Pollock."4 Previously, the Court had
ruled that states may tax owners of federal bonds.4' It held that the
federal government may tax the income of those who do business with
the states; thus, there is no constitutional prohibition on taxing private
42
citizens on the interest earned from state and local bonds.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and Scalia each
wrote concurring opinions. Justice O'Connor dissented, arguing that
the Tenth Amendment, federalism principles, and Pollock all
supported the right of the various states to issue bonds without federal
regulation. She noted that "[flederal taxation of state activities is
inherently a threat to state sovereignty," adding, "[a]s Chief Justice
long ago, 'the power to tax involves the power to
Marshall observed
43
destroy.',

Epilogue: 44 As one might expect with the Court's decision upholding
the constitutionality of the statute, there has been no Treasury
36

Id. at 513.

37 Id. at

515.

38 157

U.S. 429 (1895).
39 Baker, 485 U.S. at 516.
40 Id. at 524.
41

(1983)).
42

See id. at 526 (discussing Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner,459 U.S. 392

See id.

Id. at 533 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland,4 Wheat.
316, 431 (1819)).
For further discussion of South Carolina v. Baker, see Brown Wimberly
Dennis, Jr., John Story Morgan & Lisa Danean Rountree, Note, South Carolina v.
Baker: Taxing Taxfree Bonds, 40 MERCER L. REV. 1455 (1989); David M. Richardson,
FederalIncome Taxation of States, 19 STETSON L. REV. 411 (1990).
13
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Department or Congressional response to South Carolina v. Baker.
C. Retroactive Legislation is Constitutional
In United States v. Carlton,45 the taxpayer challenged retroactive
tax legislation on Fifth Amendment Due Process grounds. In 1986,
Congress adopted section 2057, which permitted an estate tax
deduction for half of the proceeds from the sale of certain stock to an
"employee stock ownership plan" (commonly referred to as an
ESOP) by an estate. 6 The statute required the estate to sell the stock
before the due date of its estate tax return, but did not require the
estate to own the stock before the decedent died.47 The Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, 48 enacted on December 22, 1987,
amended section 2057 retroactively to its original effective date,
October 22, 1986, to require that the decedent owned the stock at the
time of his or her death.49
After the Internal Revenue Service (Service) audited the
decedent's estate tax return, it assessed a deficiency for failing to meet
the requirements of amended section 2057. Thereafter the decedent's
estate paid the asserted deficiency and then sued in district court for a
refund, arguing that the retroactive legislation violated the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process provision. The district court agreed with
the Service's disallowance of the deduction, but the Ninth Circuit
reversed. °
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, without
mentioning a conflict among the circuits or any other reason."
At the beginning of its analysis, the Court noted that it had
repeatedly sustained retroactive tax legislation. 12 Retroactive tax
legislation must pass two tests to satisfy Due Process. " First,
Congress must not act illegally or arbitrarily.14 Second, Congress must
act promptly to make the retroactive time period modest in length 5
The estate argued that it had relied detrimentally on the law as
4' 512 U.S. 26 (1994).
46

47

Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1172, 100 Stat. 2085, 2514-15.
Id.

48 Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-1.
49 Id. § 10411, 101 Stat. 1330-432 to -433.
50 Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1062 (9th
Cir. 1992).
51

United States v. Carlton, 510 U.S. 810 (1993).

52 United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 29 (1994).
53 Id. at 30-32.
54 Id. at 32.
55 Id.
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enacted in 1986. The Court acknowledged that the taxpayer relied on
the original statute, but still refused to accept the argument.16 It
reasoned that "[tIax legislation is not a promise, and a taxpayer has no
vested right in the Internal Revenue Code."57
Epilogue: 8 With the Government win affirming Congress's action,
there has been no Treasury Department or Congressional response to
Carlton. It should be noted, however, that because the taxpayer
challenged only the retroactive aspect of the 1987 legislation, the
power of Congress to prospectively alter the section 2057 deduction
was not questioned. Thus, the impact of the Court's decision was
limited.
IV. INCOME CASES

A. Security Deposits are Not Income

In Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co.,59 the
taxpayer required some electric customers with suspect credit to make
security deposits. For those customers who established a good credit
history with the taxpayer, the deposit was refundable in time or could,
at the customer's election, be applied to current electricity charges.
Unclaimed deposits escheated to the state after seven years. Deposits
held for six to twelve months or more earned interest. 6°
The taxpayer did not treat the deposits as income but instead
listed the potential refunds as liabilities in accordance with state
regulatory rules. Nevertheless, the deposits were not escrowed or
separated in any other way from the taxpayer's other assets. The
Service contended that the deposits were income. 61 A unanimous Tax

56 Id. at 33.
57 Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33 (summarizing the description of the principle
asserted

by the Court in Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1938)).
For further discussion of Carlton, see Ronald Z. Domsky, Retroactive
Taxation: United States v. Carlton - The Taxpayer Loses Again!, 16 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 77 (1995); Laura Ricciardi & Michael B.W. Sinclair, Retroactive Civil
Legislation, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 301 (1996); Matthew D. Slepkow, Note, Resurrecting
the Challenge Against Retroactive Estate Tax Legislation: Acquiescing to the Holding
of United States v. Carlton - Over My Dead Body, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
119 (1997).
59 493 U.S. 203 (1990).
' Id. at 204-05.
61 Id. at 204-06.
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62

63

Court agreed with the taxpayer,62 and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The Court granted certiorari because of a conflict between the
circuits.64
The Court began with a restatement of the concessions by both
parties: (1) deposits are income if they are advance payments; and (2)
security deposits and loans are not income. 6' The Commissioner
asserted the security deposits were advance payments, because they
66
The taxpayer
secured the payment of electricity to be provided.
argued the payments were akin to loans, because the utility was
obligated to make refunds with interest if the customer paid for
electricity provided by the taxpayer. 67
The Court noted that both loans and advance payments provide
the taxpayer with an economic benefit.6 s Thus, the difference between
the two lies in the nature of the rights and obligations which come
with the deposit. 69 The difference is not whether the taxpayer has an
unrestricted use of the funds as this is true with a loan; rather, it "is
whether the taxpayer has some guarantee that he will be allowed to
keep the money. 70 An advance payment protects the taxpayer from
the purchaser will back out of the deal before the seller
"the risk that
71
performs.
Having established the framework for factual analysis, the Court
concluded that the taxpayer had no right to the money at the time of
deposit, because as of that time, it had sold no electricity to its
customer. The fact that the customer later chose to apply the deposit
to the payment for electricity did not change the nature of the deposit
at the time it was made.
Epilogue:73
62
63

In 1991, the Treasury Department issued Revenue

Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 964 (1987).
Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Commissioner, 857 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir.

1988).
64

490 U.S. 1033 (1989).

65

Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 203,207 (1990).

66

Id. at 208.

67

68

Id.
Id.

69

Id. at 211 (emphasis in original).

70

Id. at 210.

71
72

Id.
Id. at 211-12.

For further discussion of Indianapolis Power, see W. Eugene Seago, Supreme
CourtAdopts Loan vs. Advance Payment Test for Customer Deposits, 72 J. TAX'N 204
73
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Procedure 91-3174 to provide guidance to utilities that had previously
been reporting deposits as income. The Revenue Procedure allowed
the affected utilities to change their method of accounting for
reporting deposits without seeking Service permission for a change in
accounting method. Congress did not otherwise alter the result.
B. Corn Products Revisited

In Arkansas Best Corp. v. United States,75 the Court revisited its
76
landmark tax opinion in Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Commissioner.
Arkansas Best was a diversified holding company that owned
approximately sixty-five percent of a Texas bank. From 1969 until
1974, the taxpayer acquired large blocks of shares of the bank,
although its ownership percentage did not change significantly. In
1975, the taxpayer sold most, but not all, of its stock in the bank and
claimed an ordinary loss of nearly $10 million.77
The Commissioner disallowed the taxpayer's ordinary loss
deduction, asserting that the loss was in fact a capital lOSS. 78 The Tax
Court agreed with the Commissioner's characterization of the loss
attributable to the investments made through 1972 as a capital loss.
However, for the loss on the stock acquired after 1972, the Tax Court
concluded that the loss was ordinary, because the taxpayer was
making additional investments to protect its business reputation.79
The Eighth Circuit reversed the portion of the Tax Court's
opinion that the post-1972 losses were ordinary. 80 It held that the
stock was a capital asset within the meaning of section 1221 and the
taxpayer's purpose for acquiring stock was not relevant. The Court
granted certiorari without an apparent conflict existing among the
circuits.8

(1990); George K. Yin, Of Indianapolis Power and Light and the Definition of Debt:
Another View, 11 VA. TAX REV. 467 (1991).
74 1991-1 C.B. 566.
75 485 U.S. 212 (1988).
76

350 U.S. 46 (1955).

77 Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 214. From 1969 until 1972, the additional shares
were related to the Bank's desire to expand its capital base for growth in its business.
In 1972, the Bank's fortunes changed with a downturn in the real estate market and
acquisition of additional shares was related to loan portfolio problems. Id.
78 Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 640, 655 (1984).
71 Id. at 656-57.
80 Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 215, 221 (1986).
81 Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 215.
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Justice Marshall authored the Court's unanimous opinion that
quoted the provisions of section 1221 and noted the taxpayer's
argument that Corn Products alters the statutory definition of a
capital asset. According to the taxpayer, the Corn Products doctrine
excepts property held with a business purpose from the statutory
definition of a capital asset and, therefore, the taxpayer's motive for
holding an asset is relevant to determining if it is a capital asset.
Corn Products Refining Company processed raw corn into starch,
sugar, and other products. Because of fluctuations in the price and
available supply of corn, the company began acquiring corn futures to
hedge the market. This assured a steady supply of corn to process and
stabilized its costs. When the corn crop was ready for delivery, Corn
Products took delivery of some contracted corn and sold the excess
contracts. The Corn Products Court concluded that the gains the
taxpayer realized were ordinary and not capital, even though the
futures contracts literally fit the definition of a capital asset. The
Court determined that Congress intended for profits related to a
taxpayer's business to be taxed as ordinary income. 81
The Arkansas Best Court closely analyzed the business operations
of Corn Products Company and deemed the hedging transactions to8
be an integral part of the company's inventory acquisition system. 4
The futures contracts were not inventory per se, but were surrogates
for inventory and hardly could be separated from it. In the end, the
Arkansas Best Court concluded that Corn Products' futures contracts
were in fact included in the inventory exception to section 1221. 8
Having clarified the Corn Products decision, the Arkansas Best

Court concluded that the bank stock was not inventory for the
taxpayer who never contended to be a dealer in securities. The Court
was uncomfortable that a taxpayer's subjective motive might affect
the tax result. Depending on whether the taxpayer wants an asset to
be classified as "capital" under section 1221, it might emphasize one
motive over another to achieve the desired tax result.86
Epilogue: 81 In 1993, the Treasury Department proposed regulations in
82 Id. at 219.
83 Id. at 219-20 (explaining the reasoning in Corn Prods. Refining Co. v.

Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955)).
Id. at 220-21.
8 Id.
86 Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 222-23.
87 For further discussion of Arkansas Best, see Paul W. Reichel, Note, When Is

466
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response to the Court's opinion in Arkansas Best, which were finalized
in 1994. 88 These regulations provide guidance for business hedging
transactions to assure ordinary income treatment. Congress did not
alter the result in Arkansas Best.
C. Early Withdrawal Penaltiesare Not Dischargeof Indebtedness
Income
United States v. CentennialSavings Bank FSB 89 is the companion
case to Cottage Savings,90 discussed below in Part VII. In both cases,
the Court permitted a loss deduction when one group of mortgages
was exchanged for another. 9' Although combined on appeal with
Cottage Savings, Centennial Savings presented a second distinct issue.
Some of the taxpayer's customers were prematurely redeeming
certificates of deposit, and the taxpayer charged them early
withdrawal penalties. Relying on section 108, the taxpayer excluded
the penalties from income as discharge of indebtedness income.9
Both the District Court and the Fifth Circuit agreed with the taxpayer
on the issue, 93 and the Court granted certiorari because of a conflict

among the circuits.94
Justice Marshall, on behalf of the majority, applied a
straightforward statutory analysis to conclude that Congress intended
section 108 to apply only when the creditor released a debtor from an
obligation created at the beginning of the transaction.95 In Centennial,
the taxpayer and its depositors negotiated the penalty when the
accounts were established, and thus the penalties were not within the
exclusion of section 108. 96

Capital Stock Not a CapitalAsset? Definition of a Capital Asset after Arkansas Best

Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 831 (1990); Maria
E. O'Neill, Note, Arkansas Best Corporation v. Commissioner - The Demise of the
Corn Products Doctrine?,35 WAYNE L. REV. 1481 (1989).
88 Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2 (as amended in 2002).
8499
U.S. 573 (1991).
90 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
See infra notes 246-270 and accompanying text.
CentennialSavings, 499 U.S. at 576.
93 682 F. Supp. 1389 (N.D. Tex. 1988), affd, 887 F.2d 595 (5th Cir.
1989).
94 498 U.S. 808 (1990).
95 CentennialSavings, 499 U.S.
at 583.
91

96

,>,
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Epilogue: 97 Centennial Savings Bank concerned tax year 1981, even

though the Court's decision came nine years later. Meanwhile, in
1986, Congress amended section 108 to repeal special treatment for
qualified business indebtedness. 98 The legislative change did not
directly alter the result in Centennial Savings Bank, but it had that

It removed the exclusion from income
effect going forward.
opportunity that the taxpayer sought when it attempted to
characterize

the

early

withdrawal

penalties

as

discharge

of

indebtedness income.
Without the repealed exclusion, the
classification of the early withdrawal penalties as income is not in
doubt.
D. Adjusted Basis Calculationsof AMT Purposes
In United States v. Hill,99 an alternative minimum tax (AMT) case,

the taxpayers and the Service disputed the correct computation of the
taxpayers' adjusted basis in mineral deposits. Under the AMT, the
amount a taxpayer's depletion deduction exceeds the adjusted basis in

the mineral interest is an item of preference income. '0 The taxpayers
included in their adjusted basis the costs of depreciable property'0 '
used to exploit the mineral deposits - for example, pipes, machinery,

and tools -

that have not been recovered (deducted) for tax

purposes. The Court granted certiorari because of the perceived
importance of the issue to federal tax collections.0 2

The Court quickly moved its focus of consideration to the
fundamental rule that changes the basis of an asset after acquisition:
For further discussion of Centennial Savings, see Henry Ordower, Revisiting
Realization:Accretion Taxation, the Constitution, Macomber, And Mark to Market, 13
VA. TAX REV. 1 (1993); James L. Black Jr., Note, Are Early Withdrawal Penalties
Income by Reason of Discharge of Indebtedness?: United States v. Centennial Savings
Bank FSB, 45 TAX LAw. 527 (1992).
98 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 822, 100 Stat. 2085,
2373.
99 506 U.S. 546 (1993).
100 I.R.C. § 57(a)(8) (1954). This provision was amended by the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 701, 100 Stat. 2085, 2333-35, and in amended form is
now contained in I.R.C. § 57(a)(1).
101 I.R.C. § 263(c) (1954) and Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(c)(1) (1965) differentiated
between intangible drilling costs and tangible drilling costs. Intangible costs may be
currently deducted but tangible drilling costs are capital items that must be
depreciated. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(c)(1) has never been amended; I.R.C. § 263(c) has
been amended since Hill but is materially the same now as it was when the Court
rendered its decision.
97

102

Hill, 506 U.S. at 549.
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section 1016.'03 This section controls post-acquisition upward and
downward adjustments to a taxpayer's basis of an asset.' ° Within the
section framework, the Court reasoned, basis must be determined
separately for parts of an asset when sold.
For example, when
improved real property is sold, the basis of the land is calculated
separately from the building because the tax treatment of the
disposition of each part is potentially different.1°6 Thus, the Court
concluded that the tangible drilling costs are separate from the cost of
the mineral interest and the two may not be added together when
calculating the amount by which the depletion allowance exceeds the
taxpayer's basis in the mineral interest.'°7
Epilogue:'O

Section 1915(a) of the Energy Policy Act of 1992'9

amended section 57(a)(1) to remove percentage depletion computed
under section 613A as a tax-preference item from AMT calculations.
This change exempts independent oil and gas producers, such as the
Hills from the AMT, thereby reversing the result in Hill. The
legislative change did not affect solid mineral producers and
integrated producers, however.
V. THE DAMAGES CASES

The most visible example of the Court repeatedly considering the
nuances of a recurring tax issue involves taxation of damages. A
statutory exclusion for personal injuries damages may be traced to the
Revenue Act of 1918.110 More recently, section 104(a)(2), before
amendment in 1989 and again in 1996, excluded "the amount of any
damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump

103

Id. at 554.

104I.R.C. § 1016 (1954); this section is materially the same now as it was when the

Court rendered its decision.
105Hill, 506 U.S. at 557-58.
106 Id.
107Id. at 559-60.
108 For further discussion of Hill, see Lawrence A. Jegen, III, U. S. Supreme
Court Held That the Adjusted Basis of Taxpayers' Interests In Mineral Deposits Did
Not Include Unrecovered Costs of Depreciable Tangible Drilling and Development
Costs for Purposes of Calculating Alternative Minimum Tax, 37 RES GESTAE 482
(1994); see also Juli Oh, Note, United States v. Hill: Limiting the Use of Tangible
Costs to DecreaseMinimum Tax Burden, 47 TAx LAW. 1047 (1994).
109Pub. L. No. 102-486, sec. 1915(a), 106 Stat. 2776, 3023 (1992).
110 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919).
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sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or
sickness" from a taxpayer's gross income."'
A. Sex DiscriminationAward is Gross Income

The Rehnquist Court first addressed the taxation of damages
issue when it considered whether back pay awarded in a Title VII sex
discrimination was gross income. In United States v. Burke,"'
certiorari was granted because of a conflict among the circuits.' The
taxpayer asserted that section 104(a)(2) excluded monetary damages
received as a result of an award for sex discrimination from income
because they are "damages received.., on account of personal
injuries or sickness.""14 Thus, the issue was quickly framed as whether
sex discrimination was a personal injury. If it was, then authority
provided an exclusion from income for damages even though those
damages are based on lost income."' If sex discrimination is not a
personal injury, no exclusion from income exists.
Neither section 104 nor the applicable regulations provide any
guidance for the question presented, but the regulations required
excludable damages to be paid on account of an "action based upon
tort or tort type rights." 116 Thus, the Court reframed the issue as
whether a right to recover back pay for sex discrimination based on
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a tort or tort-like claim and17
thus qualifies for the exclusion from income as personal injury.
Essentially the Court determined that it should examine the nature of
the claim.
Title VII limits its remedies to "backpay, injunctions, and other
equitable relief." 118 No relief is granted for "pain and suffering,
emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other consequential
damages.... "9 With that backdrop, the Court concluded that Title
VII damages are not based on tort principles and thus do not qualify
III I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1986).
112 504

U.S. 229 (1992).

113 Id. at

233.

Id. at 232.
115See Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1986), affd, 848 F.2d 81
114

(6th Cir. 1988).
116 Burke, 504 U.S. at 234 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c)
(1970)).
117 Id. at 237-38 & n.7.
118 Id.

at 238 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(g), 78
Stat. 241, 261 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2005)).
119 Id. at 239.
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for exclusion from income under section 104.12'
Epilogue:12' Section 7641 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1989122 amended section 104(a)(2) to limit the exclusion from
income for certain punitive damages.
• - 1123Only those that relate to
physical injuries or sickness are excluded.
This change did not per se
moot the Court's 1992 decision in Burke in which the taxpayer was
awarded back pay, not punitive damages, as a result of prior
discrimination. In 1996, however, Congress again amended section
104(a)(2) in the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996.124 This
time, Congress removed the exclusion from income for all damages
other than those received on account of personal physical injury or
physical sickness. Thus, by the 1996 revision, the Burke rule was
codified.
B. Age DiscriminationAward is Gross Income
The next case concerning income taxation of damages that the
Court considered was Commissioner v. Schleier,l2' an age
discrimination case based on the Age Discrimination in Employment
126
Act of 1967 (ADEA).
The Tax Court ruled for the taxpayer and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed. 12' The Court granted certiorari because of a
128
conflict among the circuits.

120

Id. at 241-42. Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, argued that the "purposes and

operation" of sex discrimination under Title VII are "closely analogous to those of
tort law." Id. at 249 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). According to Justice O'Connor, the
failure of the statute to provide redress for injuries other than back pay is not
determinative of the tax consequences. Id.
121 For further discussion of Burke, see Mary L. Heen, An Alternative
Approach
to the Taxation of Employment Discrimination Recoveries under FederalCivil Rights
Statutes: Income from Human Capital, Realization, and Nonrecognition, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 549 (1994); Douglas A. Kahn, Compensatory and Punitive Damages for a
PersonalInjury: To Tax or Not To Tax?, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 327 (1994).
122 Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641, 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (1989).
123

Id.

124 Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838 (1996).
12 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
126 Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967).
127 1993 WL 767976 (T.C. July 7, 1993), affid, 26 F.3d 1119 (1994), rev'd,
515 U.S.

323 (1995).
18 Compare Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836
(7th Cir. 1994) (requiring
inclusion in gross income of amount received by taxpayer in settlement of litigation
under ADEA with Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994) (allowing
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The Supreme Court looked closely at the tax statute and its
requirement that damages be paid "on account of personal injuries or
sickness."' 29 To illustrate its point about the expansive consequences
of adopting the taxpayer's test, the Court provided an example of a
taxpayer injured in car accident and who had incurred medical
expenses, lost wages, and physical injuries."3 A settlement of all
claims would be excluded from income because the payment for each
type of injury resulted from "personal injuries or sickness" within the
meaning of section 104.31
With this example as a reference point, the Court concluded that
the taxpayer's age discrimination cause of action, and the damages she
recovered, did not relate to any personal injury. 32 Although the
Court conceded that a plaintiff might suffer "some psychological or
'personal' injury"'33 resulting from the discrimination, "[t]he amount
of back wages recovered is completely independent of the existence or
extent of any personal injury."'3 The Court then stated that "an
exclusion from gross income is authorized by the regulation only when
it both (i) was received through prosecution or settlement of an action
based upon tort or tort type rights..,
and (ii) was received on account
35
sickness.'
or
injuries
of personal
The taxpayer in Schleier attempted to use the Court's opinion in
Burke to define age discrimination as a tort or tort-like claim, arguing
that Burke held that sex discrimination was not a tort or tort-like
because these claims did not entitle the plaintiff to a jury trial or
liquidated damages. 136 The Schleier Court dismissed the argument,
ruling that the holding of Burke provides that a tort or tort-like
recovery requires possible recovery for "traditional harms associated
with personal injury, such as pain and suffering, emotional
distress,
137
harm to reputation, or other consequential damages.",
Justice O'Connor dissented in Schleier, as she did in Burke, and
was once again joined by Justice Thomas and picked up the vote of
exclusion of damages received in settlement of litigation under ADEA from gross
income).
129 Schleier, 515 U.S. at 327 (internal quotation
omitted).
130

Id. at 329-30.

131

Id.
Id. at 330.

132
133

Id.

134

Id.

135 Schleier, 515

U.S. at 333-34 (internal citations omitted).

136

Id. at 334-35.

137

Id. at 335-36 (quoting United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 239 (1992)).
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The dissent argued that age discrimination is a

"personal injury,"13 although not a tangible injury, such as physical
139
and mental injuries.

Epilogue: 140 Schleier was decided in 1995, the year before Congress
finally resolved the damages exclusion.
C. Punitive Damages are Included in Gross Income

The third case in which the Rehnquist Court reviewed the income
taxation of damages was O'Gilvie v. United States.14'

The Court

granted certiorari to consider whether punitive damages awarded as a
part of a tort suit are gross income. 42
In O'Gilvie, there was no question that the injuries were personal
injuries.'
The excludability from income of recovery for those
injuries turned on the causal relationship required by the statutory
condition that recovery be "on account of personal injuries."' 44 In its
two prior decisions, the Court focused on the meaning of "personal
injuries.,14 The Court now considered two possible interpretations of
the "on account of" phrase. The taxpayers asserted a simple "'but for'
connection."' 46 All damages awarded in a personal injury lawsuit are
on account of the personal injury. If there are no personal injuries,
then there are no damages.' 47
The Government argued, however, for more connection between
138 Id. at 337 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
139

Id.

140 For further discussion of Schleier, see J. Martin Burke & Michael
K. Friel,

Getting Physical:Excluding PersonalInjury Awards Under the New Section 104(a)(2),
58 MONT. L. REV. 167 (1997); Donald J. Zahn, Personal Injury Exclusion: Is the
Slashing of Wrists Necessary?, 13 AKRON TAX J. 129 (1997); see also the discussion of
Congress's post-Burke amendment of section 104(a), supra notes 122-121 and
accompanying text.
14' 519 U.S. 79 (1996).
142 Id. at 82 (noting that the Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, and Federal
Circuits had ruled
that punitive damages are income, while the Sixth Circuit excluded punitive damage
rewards from income).
143 The plaintiffs were the husband and children of a woman who
died of toxic
shock syndrome. Id. at 81.
144 Id. (citing I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988) (emphasis added)).
145 See discussions of Burke and Schleier, supra notes 112-145 and accompanying
text.
146
147

O'Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 82.
Id.
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473

the personal injuries and the damages awarded.'9 In the case of
punitive damages, the award does "not compensate for any kind of
Ioss. ''149 Rather, punitive damages are awarded because of "a
defendant's reprehensible conduct and the jury's need to punish and
to deter it."' 150 The majority of the Court preferred the government's
interpretation of the statute. It found the taxpayers' statutory
interpretations, policy arguments, and view of legislative history
unpersuasive. Moreover, the majority argued that its prior opinion in
Schleier came close to resolving the issue. In Schleier, the Court ruled
that age discrimination damages "are not 'designed to compensate
ADEA victims,' ... instead they are 'punitive in nature.""'15 This view
of its prior opinion buttressed the O'Gilvie Court's conclusion that
punitive damages are not 52"damages received... on account of" the
plaintiff's personal injury.
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor
and Thomas, rejected the majority's reading of the statute. Section
104(a)(1) limits the exclusion for workmen's compensation awards to
"'compensation for' personal injuries or sickness., 5 3 By contrast,
section 104(a)(2) excludes "any damages received.., on account of
such [personal] injuries or sickness., 15 4 The dissent found that the
difference in legislative drafting clearly indicated a Congressional
intent to tax the damages of the two types of injuries differently.
Epilogue:15 5 Congress amended section 104 in the Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996,156 which was enacted on August 20, 1996. In
this amendment, Congress removed the exclusion from income for all

148

Id. at 83.

149 Id. at 86-87.
150

Id. at 83.

151Id. at 84 (quoting Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 332
(1995))

(citations omitted).
152

Id.

153

O'Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting I.R.C. § 104(a)(1)

(1988)).
154Id. at 96 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting § 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act
of

1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1065-66) (emphasis in original)).
155For further discussion of O'Gilvie, see Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen,
DiscriminationAgainst Damages for Unlawful Discrimination: The Supreme Court,
Congress, and the Income Tax, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 447 (1998); see also F. Patrick

Hubbard, Making People Whole Again: The Constitutionalityof Taxing Compensatory
Tort Damagesfor Mental Distress, 49 FLA. L. REV. 725 (1997).
156

Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838 (1996).
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damages other than those directly received on account of personal
physical injury or physical sickness not to include punitive damages in
those instances. This amendment was enacted nearly two months
before the Court heard oral arguments and nearly four months before
the Court rendered its opinion in O'Gilvie.
D. Legal Fees are Gross Income
A fourth damages opinion, Commissioner v. Banks,"' did not

focus on the exclusion from income for a damages award under
section 104(a)(2). Rather, it considered whether the portion of a
damages award paid to a plaintiff's attorney is included in the
plaintiff's gross income." 9 The issue was tax-meaningful under the

AMT rules, because if the portion of the award to the attorney is
included in the gross income of the plaintiff, the AMT effectively
taxes the plaintiff on the monies paid to his or her attorney because no
deduction is permitted for that tax computation.
Banks and Banaitis v. Commissioner, which was consolidated
with Banks on appeal, concerned taxpayers who had settled
employment-related complaints with their former employers.' 62 The

unanimous majority concluded that the amount paid to the attorney
out of the settlement proceeds by the taxpayer was an anticipatory
assignment of income by the taxpayer.1 3 Although the taxpayer did

not have dominion and control over the income when paid, the
taxpayer had control over the asset which produced the income and

157

See supra note 124 and accompanying text.

158

125 S. Ct. 826 (2005). It should be noted that Chief Justice Rehnquist took no

part in the decision in Banks.
159 Id. at 826-27.
160The alternative minimum tax eliminates miscellaneous itemized deductions
for expenses. Thus, even if the amount paid for legal fees from a damages settlement
is deemed a deductible expense, a taxpayer paying the alternative minimum tax would
not be permitted to deduct that amount from his alternative minimum taxable
income. The calculation of the taxpayer's liability under the alternative minimum tax
would include the amount paid to the attorney, and thus the taxpayer would in effect
pay taxes on the entire amount received in the settlement.
161340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003).
162 Banaitis arose out of the taxpayer's settlement with his former employer of
claims for (1) wrongful discharge and (2) interference with his employment by a
corporation that acquired his employer. Id. at 1077-78. The attorney's fees in Banks
came from a settlement of an employment discrimination action. Banks, 125 S. Ct. at
826.
163Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 831.
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that was sufficient to invoke the doctrine.' 64
Epilogue: 165 The AMT issue raised by legal fees paid was partially

resolved by Congress after the Court granted certiorari in Banks, but
before the Court rendered its decision.' 66 Section 703 of the American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which amended section 62(a)(20), now

provides that a deduction from gross income for attorney fees and
court costs paid in connection with any action for unlawful
discrimination up to the amount of the judgment or settlement that is
included in gross income. 167

While this section renders moot the ruling in Banks, it does not
reverse Banks in matters in which legal fees are paid for reasons not
covered by section 62(a)(20). In particular, legal fees associated with
punitive damages are not covered by the new statute. Thus, as a result
of Banks and O'Gilvie, a taxpayer with a contingent fee will pay

alternative minimum taxes on one hundred percent of punitive
damages received, while netting less because of legal fees and other
litigation expenses paid from punitive damages award.
VI. CHARITABLE DEDUCTION CASES

A. Excess Insurance Costs Not a CharitableDeduction for ABA
Members
United States v. American Bar Endowment,1 68 decided while
169
Rehnquist was still an associate Justice, involved taxpayers 17 who
claimed charitable deductions for amounts paid for insurance

premiums that allegedly cost more than market rates for similar
164

Id. at 831-32.

165 For further discussion of Banks, see D. Michael O'Leary, Supreme Court

Agrees with IRS on ContingentAttorney Fee Cases, 79-JUN FLA. B.J. 75 (2005).
541 U.S. 958 (2004).
166 Certiorari was granted on March 29, 2004.

The

American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004), was
enacted on October 22, 2004. The Court heard oral arguments on November 1, 2004,
and rendered its opinion on January 24, 2005. Banks, 125 S. Ct. at 826.
167 Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118 Stat. at 1546-47.
168

477 U.S. 105 (1986).

169 This is one of two Burger Court decisions reviewed in this article because of

the Rehnquist Court's heavy reliance on it. The other Burger Court decision is
Jewett. See infra notes 383-393 and accompanying text.
170 Am. Bar Endowment was combined on appeal with the cases of several
individual taxpayers who had purchased insurance from the Endowment and claimed
charitable contributions for a portion of their premium payments. Id. at 108-09.
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insurance.17 The Endowment asserted that its profits were charitable
contributions for taxpayers who purchased insurance from it. The
factual record indicated that the taxpayers were not paying more for
insurance coverage through the American Bar Endowment than they
would for similar coverage from other sources.12
The Court held that a charitable deduction is only permitted
when the amount paid to the charitable organization exceeds the
value of the benefit received. It cited favorably the two-part test of
Revenue Ruling 67-246, which permits charitable deductions when the
payment to the charity exceeds the value of the benefit received and
the donor intends to make a charitable gift.7 3 Most of the individual
taxpayers in the lawsuit failed the first test because the payment did
114
One of the
not exceed the cost of similar insurance coverage.
taxpayers passed the first test but failed the second, because he was
not aware of the less expensive coverage until after the payments in
controversy were made.'75
Epilogue: 17 6
After the Court's decision, the American Bar
Endowment altered its procedures to qualify a portion of the
premium payments for charitable deductions. Under the agreement
between the Endowment and the Service, each insurance purchaser is
given notice to demand a refund of the excess cost within a limited
amount of time each year. 177 With that change in its procedures, the
American Bar Endowment satisfied the Service on the qualification of
the charitable contribution.

171

Id. at 108. The decision also considered the issue of whether the profits of the

Endowment were "unrelated business income" and subject to the unrelated business
income tax of Code sections 511-513. Id. at 106.
172 Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 116.
173 Id. at 117 (citing Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104).
174

Id.

175 Id. at 117-18.
176 For further discussion of Am. Bar Endowment, see Lisa Huettner
Dolan,

Note, Charitable Donations or Unrelated Business Income?: United States v.
American Bar Endowment, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 817 (1987); Angela M. Donovan, Note,
Fund-Raising or Unrelated Business? Tax Consequences for Exempt Organizations
and Contributors: United States v. American Bar Endowment, 40 TAx LAW. 395
(1987).
177 Given its particular facts, I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-25-056 (Mar. 25, 1987)
probably is the agreement between the Internal Revenue Service (Service) and the
Endowment.
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B. Scientologist Denied Deductionfor Fees Paid
•

•

17817

In Hernandez v. Commissioner,

the taxpayers 179 deducted

amounts paid to the Church of Scientology as section
170 charitable
•• 180
contributions.
All payments were for training
or one-on-one
sessions called auditing. 181 The Church charged a set price for each
session. The fees paid were the Church's primary source of income.
The Church offered discounts for prepaid fees and generally gave
refunds for unused portions of fees.1 2 The Commissioner conceded
that the Church was a qualified charity entitled to receive tax
deductible contributions. With this concession, the Court concluded
that the issue was narrowly framed as whether auditing and training
fees are charitable contributions deductible under section 170.'83 84The
Court granted certiorari because of a conflict among the circuits.'
The Court quoted favorably the Tax Court's decision in Graham
v. Commissioner,185 which concluded that a section 170 charitable
contribution means a gift or "a voluntary transfer of property...
without consideration therefor."1 86 Thus the question was stated as
"whether petitioners' payments for auditing and training sessions are
'contribution[s] or gift[s]' within the meaning of § 170. " 187
The majority reviewed the limited legislative history of section
170 and affirmed the no "quid pro quo" rule of the lower courts; for
example, payments to a charitable hospital are not charitable
contributions if made for medical treatment.180 Hernandez was similar

490 U.S. 680 (1989).
cases were combined on appeal: Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d
1212 (1st Cir. 1987), and Graham v. Commissioner,822 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1987).
180 Training involves the study of the tenets of
Scientology and leads to
qualification as auditors. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 685.
178

179 Two

181

These sessions are also called "'processing,' 'counseling,' and 'pastoral

counseling."' Id. at 684 n.2.
182 Id. at 685-86.
183 Id. at 686-89.
184

The First, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits found for the government, while

the Second and Eighth Circuits found for the taxpayer.
18583 T.C. 575 (1984).
186 Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 687 (emphasis
in original) (quoting Graham, 83 T.C.
at 580).
187 Id. at 690 (alterations in original).
188 Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 196, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621,
4831, and H.R. REP. No. 83-1337 at A44, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4044-

45).
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to the Court's prior opinion in American Bar Endowment,8 9 discussed
above, in which taxpayers claimed charitable deductions for amounts
paid for insurance premiums that were allegedly higher than market
rates.

In American Bar Endowment, the Court upheld the

Commissioner's disallowance, because the taxpayers did not prove
that they were aware of lower cost insurance at the time of purchase,
and therefore could not establish that the transaction was other than a
quid pro quo.' 9° When that principle was applied to Hernandez, the
charitable deduction failed because a set price was established for the
auditing and training courses.191

The majority rejected the taxpayers' argument that quid pro quo
is not the appropriate analysis when the benefit received is entirely
religious in nature.' 92 It believed that the taxpayers' position would
open the charitable deduction for tuition to parochial schools,
payments for counseling sessions sponsored by a church, or medical
treatment received at a hospital.' 93 Finally, the Court rejected a claim

that the Commissioner's long standing administrative policy allowed
deductions of payments associated with religious activities such as pew
dues and tickets to Jewish High Holy Day events."" This final
argument was not considered on its merits, because the Court
concluded that the record at trial on this issue was not complete. 195
A well-reasoned dissent by Justice O'Connor, who was joined by
Justice Scalia, argued that the Commissioner was not consistent in his

treatment among various religions and cited Revenue Ruling 70-47'96

and its allowance of a deduction for pew dues and other payments to97
religious charities in which something was received in exchange.'
Moreover, the dissent believed that it was possible to permit a
deduction for the portion of a payment that exceeded the value of the
quid pro quo. Justice O'Connor illustrated the potential with an
example of a $1,000 ticket to a charity dinner when the value of the
189 477
190

191
192
193

U.S. 105 (1986); see supra notes 168-176 and accompanying text.

Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 691.

Id.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 693. The majority also rejected constitutional arguments "based on the

Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment." Id. at
694. Examination of these arguments is beyond the scope of this article.
194 Id. at 701-02 (citing Rev. Rul. 70-47, 1970-1 C. B. 49 (authorizing charitable
deductions for pew rents, building fund assessments, and periodic dues)).
195 Id. at 702-03.
196 1970-1 C.B. 49.
197 Hernandez, 680 U.S. at 708 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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food is only $50.198
Epilogue: 199 Since Hernandez was decided, the media reports that the
Service and the Church of Scientology have settled their dispute and a
tax deduction is permissible for auditing and training sessions. 2°° The
Service, in Revenue Ruling 93-78,201 announced that Revenue Ruling
78-189202 was obsolete.
The 1978 ruling set out the Service's
disallowance for Scientology auditing and training sessions. The 1993
ruling did not specifically authorize a deduction, however.
A
Westlaw® search does not yield a published position on this issue
other than Revenue Ruling 93-78. Alison Eaton, in a law review
article, provides much greater detail concerning the Service's alleged
reversal of Hernandez. 203 Sklar v. Commissioner, a case involving an
attempt to deduct the cost of tuition for the taxpayers' children to
attend religious schools,
reports
the Service's refusal to disclose any
•
•
204
"deal" with the Scientologists.
C. Direct Support of Children Serving as MissionariesNot Deductible
S

205

In Davis v. United States, the taxpayers provided direct financial
support to their adult children when the children were serving as
missionaries for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. The
direct support was consistent with church policies and procedures that
expected the parents of missionaries to subsidize the cost of their
children serving the church in the mission fields. 206 Benefits to the
church included reduced bookkeeping and administration, among
198
199

Id. at 706 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
For further discussion of Hernandez, see Religious Payments as Deductible

CharitableContributions, 103 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1989); see also Daniel Rattin Mitz,
Note, Save Your Local Church or Synagogue: When are Taxpayer Contributions to
Religious OrganizationsDeductible Under Section 170?, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 840 (1988).
For more on the Service's alleged reversal of the position taken in Hernandez, see
Alison Eaton, Comment, Can the IRS Overrule the Supreme Court?, 45 EMORY L.J.
987 nn.2-17 and accompanying text (1996).
200 Elizabeth MacDonald, Scientologists and IRS Settled for $12.5 Million, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 30, 1997, at A12.
201 1993-2 C.B. 75.
202 1978-1 C.B. 68.
203 See Eaton, Can the IRS Overrule the Supreme Court, 45 EMORY L.J. 987 nn.217 and accompanying text (1996).
204 282 F.3d 610, 614-15 (9th Cir. 2002).
205 495 U.S. 472 (1990).
206 Id. at 474.
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480

other things. 207 The Court granted certiorari because of a conflict
among lower courts.208
The church established the amount parents were to provide each
child for living expenses such as rent, transportation, and food. 2 9 The
church regulated the activities of the missionaries and group leaders
210
When it deemed appropriate,
submitted weekly expense reports.
the church altered the amount supplied by the parents to missionarychildren.21 On amended income tax returns, the taxpayers claimed
tax refunds for the money given to their children for mission field
expenses as section 170 charitable deductions. The Service denied the
refund claims.1 2
Section 170 permits a charitable deduction for amounts given "to
or for the use of" qualified charities."' In the litigation, the taxpayers
conceded that their transfers to their children were not "to" a
qualified charity, but asserted that the amounts given were "for the
use of" a qualified charity. 214 The Court conceded that the phrase "for
the use of" could be interpreted broadly as suggested by the
taxpayers.

21' However,

the phrase could also be narrowly interpreted
216

to mean "intrust for" the charity as the Service argued.
To resolve the disagreement, the Court reviewed the legislative
history of section 170. The original version of section 170 did not
include the phrase "for the use of" but instead permitted deductions
only for gifts "to" qualified charities. 21' However, in 1921, Congress
amended the predecessor to section 170 to permit deductions for gifts
"for the use of" charities in response to requests to permit deductions
chests., 21 8
to "charitable trusts, charitable foundations, or community
Next, the Court considered the historical meaning of the word "use."
It determined that the English common law meaning of "use" is
2017 Id.
208

Id. at 476-77.

209 Id.
210
211
212

Davis, 495 U.S. at 475.
Id.
Id. at 47-77.

21

I.R.C. § 170(c) (1982).

214

Davis, 495 U.S. at 477.
Id. at 479.
Id.
Davis, 495 U.S. at 479-80 (citing the War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63,

215
216
217

§ 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330).
218 Id. at 480 (citing the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §
214(a)(11), 42 Stat. 227,
241).
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similar to a trust.2 ' 9 Finally, the Court considered the fact that the
Service had adopted the limited "trust" interpretation of the "for the
use of" phrase soon after the 1921 amendment to section 170
persuasive. 220 The administrative interpretation does not carry the
same weight of authority as a regulation, but still carries considerable
221
weight.
Ultimately, the Court held that the taxpayers' transfers were not
transfers "'in trust for' the Church. 22 2 Only by making gifts to a trust
for the church or some other "enforceable legal arrangement for the
benefit of the church" could taxpayers satisfy section 170.223
Epilogue: 224 After Davis, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints changed its policies and procedures to permit parents of
missionaries •and
other
•
• 225 donors to transfer funds to the Church to
support missionaries.
Based on the new procedures, the Service
concluded that gifts to support missionaries would satisfy the
requirements of section 170 except "if an investigation should uncover
facts which affirmatively establish that the Church does not control
the expenditure of the donations or that a commitment or
understanding exists at the time of contribution that the funds will be
spent for the benefit of a particular missionary .... ,,226 Thus, as in the
aftermath of the Hernandez decision, the Court's ultimate role was to
set the subsequent terms for compromise between the taxpayer and
the Service.

219 Id.
220

at 481-82.

Id.

Id. at 484.
Id. at 486.
223 Davis, 495 U.S. at 486.
224 For further discussion of Davis, see Joel S. Newman, A Proposal
for Direct,
Deductible CharitableContributions,96 DICK. L. REV. 209 (1992); Richard A. Leavitt,
221

222

Casenote, When is a Gift to the Minister Not a Gift to the Church? - The Impact of
Davis v. United States on CharitableGiving, 66 TUL. L. REV. 245 (1991).

I.R.S. Litig. Guide. Mem. TL-34 (Rev), 1993 WL 1470341 (Apr. 23, 1993)
(describing in detail the new procedure called "equalized funding approach" for
financing the cost of missionaries).
225

226

Id.
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VII. OTHER PERSONAL DEDUCTION CASES

A. Trade or Business Clarified
In Commissioner v. Groetzinger, the Court considered whether a
professional gambler was in a trade or business even though he did
221
not sell goods or services to customers. 22
While the Court focused on
whether the taxpayer's losses qualified as section 162 trade or business
expenses, the underlying issue arose under the AMT regime. Section
162 deductions reduce AMT income, but ignore gambling losses for
the tax year in question that are not connected with a trade or
business.
In its 1940 opinion in Deputy v. DuPont, the Court considered
whether certain expenses of the taxpayer met the requirement of the
predecessor of section 162. 228 Ultimately, the Court decided the
expenses did not satisfy the ordinary and necessary requirement of the
deduction. 229 Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, questioned
whether the taxpayer was in a trade or business because he deemed it
necessary for the taxpayer to sell goods or services to others to satisfy
the requirement for a trade or business deduction. 2 ' ° Frankfurter's
goods or services test presented the taxpayer in Groetzinger with a
substantial hurdle because he gambled only for his own account. The
taxpayer did not satisfy the goods or services test of DuPont despite
betting on dog races six days a week, forty-eight weeks a year.
The Court reviewed its own precedent and concluded that
Frankfurter's goods or services requirement was judicial gloss that had
never "achieved the status of a Court holding., 231 With that potential
precedent side-stepped,
the Court concluded that the taxpayer was in
S
232
a trade or business.
A three-Justice dissent argued that gambling
for one's own account was not a trade or business. 3 3
Epilogue:234
227

In 1982, years before the Court granted certiorari in

480 U.S. 23 (1987).

228308 U.S. 488 (1940).
229Id. at 497.
230Id. at 499 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
231Groetzinger,480 U.S. at 32.
232

Id. at 35.

233Id. at 37 (White, J., dissenting).

For further discussion of Groetzinger see Jerald David August and Steven
J.
Levine, Goods and Services Test for Trade or Business Rejected by Supreme Court, 66
J. TAX'N 298 (1987); see also Andrew M. Curtis, Commissioner v. Groetzinger -
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Groetzinger, Congress amended the AMT rules to permit a deduction
The amended AMT rules applied to tax years
for gambling losses.
236
Thus, by the time Groetzinger was
beginning in 1983 and later.
decided, its holding had been superseded by statute four years earlier.
B. Profit Motive Required
237
In Portland Golf Club v. Commissioner, the taxpayer was a
social club that sought to deduct expenses associated with nonmembers to offset investment income.238 The circuit court ruled that
the taxpayer could use the expenses in excess of non-member income
to reduce investment income only if sales to non-members were done
with a profit motive. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because
239
of a conflict among the circuits.
The real question involved in PortlandGolf was the method to be
used to compute the taxpayer's intent to make a profit. Specifically,
should the taxpayer's indirect or fixed costs reduce receipts from nonmembers to determine a profit motive? 24° When computing a loss
from non-member sales, the taxpayer included indirect costs in the
computation, but when determining its profit motive, the taxpayer
excluded indirect costs. The Supreme Court agreed with the Service
that the same method of accounting must be used for both
241
computations.

Epilogue: 242 In Announcement 90-138, 243 the Service reaffirmed its

Supreme Court Holds that the 'Goods or Services' Test is not a Prerequisiteto 'Trade
or Business' Status, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221 (1987).
235 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, § 201(a), 96 Stat. 324, 41114 (amending Code section 55(e)(1)(A).
236 According to the dissenters, the 1982 amendment made it clear that Congress
did not intend gambling to be a trade or business and the statutory change did not
make gambling a trade or business for the purposes of section 162. Rather, the
change provided equitable relief from an unfair imposition of the alternative
minimum tax. Groetzinger,480 U.S. at 37-38 (White, J., dissenting).
237 497 U.S. 154 (1990).
238 Receipts from members were exempt from the social club's income under
section 501(c)(7). I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) (1990). However, the club's investment income
was taxable under section 512(a)(3)(A). PortlandGolf Club, 497 U.S. at 161 n.11.
239 PortlandGolf Club, 497 U.S. at
160.
240 Id. at 164-65. Indirect costs are general overhead items,
costs the taxpayer
would incur if it had no sales to non-members.
241 Id. at 171.
242 For further discussion of Portland Golf see Carolyn P. Chiechi & Jeffrey W.

484
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and instructed its field offices to

complete the cases suspended pending the Court's decision in

Portland Golf. Moreover, the Service warned social clubs that it
would be "[c]losely monitoring the return filing patterns of section
501(c)(7) organizations. It will be doing this to see if social clubs are

filing amended Form 990-T returns where necessary and to identify
those clubs for examination that should be filing Form 990-T returns

and that are not currently doing so." 245
C. Exchange of Mortgages is Loss Recognition Event
24 6 the taxpayer sold
In Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner,
participation interests in a group of mortgages it owned and,

simultaneously, bought about the same value of participation interests
in another group of mortgages from its buyer. 247 The taxpayer
represented to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board that the
mortgages exchanged were "substantially identical., 248 On its 1980

income tax return, the taxpayer claimed a loss for the difference
between the value and the face amount of the loans it exchanged.
The Tax Court allowed the loss deduction, 21° but the Sixth Circuit
reversed, holding that the loss was not sustained under the rules of
section 165(a). 251 The Court granted certiorari because of the
importance of the issue to the savings and loan industry and because
of a conflict among the circuits. 252

Munk, When Can Social Clubs Offset Investment Income with Losses from
Nonmember Activities?, 73 J. TAX'N 184 (1990); Karen L. Conant, Note, Tax Exempt
Social Clubs Must Use Consistent Accounting Methods: Portland Golf Club v.
Commissioner, 44 TAX LAW. 1165 (1991).
244

1990-51 I.R.B. 38.
1981-1 C.B. 351.

245

I.R.S. Announcement 90-138, 1990-51 I.R.B. 38.

243

246499 U.S. 554 (1991).
247 A participation interest in a mortgage is a partial interest
in the instrument

held along with other lenders.
248 Cottage Sav., 499 U.S. at 557 (citing Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, Memo.
R-49 (June 27, 1980)).
249 Id. at 558.
250

90 T.C. 372 (1988).

251 Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 890 F.2d 848, 855 (6th
Cir. 1989).
252 Cottage Sav., 499 U.S. at 558 (referring to Cottage Sav., 890 F.2d

848
(disallowing the loss deduction); Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Commissioner, 896
F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (allowing the loss deduction); San Antonio Sav. Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1989) (same)).
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Section 1001 provides that a taxpayer recognizes a gain or loss
only when a disposition of property occurs; however, mere
fluctuations in value are not income or deductions. 2 5' Therefore, the
Commissioner framed the issue as whether there was an exchange of
materially different property within the section 1001 context.254 The
taxpayer countered that any exchange of property is a disposition or,
in the alternative, the exchange it entered into was materially different
because the security for the various loans all differed.
The Commissioner argued that the properties were "materially
different" only if they "differ in economic substance., 25 6 The
Commissioner's position was not supported by Treasury Regulations,
and thus the Court resorted to case law to define "materially
different." That inquiry led first to a classic case in early tax
257
This Court decision dealt with
controversy, Eisner v. Macomber.
"realization" under section 1001 and held that a pro rata stock
258
Three additional Court decisions
dividend was not income.
involving exchange of corporate stock in reorganizations refined the
Macomber principle. 259 Two of these transactions were realization
260
events because the corporations changed domicile, while the third
was not because the new corporation was in the same state. 2 61 From
these cases the Court gleaned a rule that realization occurs when "the
property entitlements are not identical., 262 The Court also noted that
the statute itself supported this reading of section 1001, under which
dispositions of property are recognized unless one of the statutory
Section 1031 provides for
exceptions specifically applies.
nonrecognition of realized gains and losses when property of like kind
is exchanged. The Court reasoned that section 1031's nonrecognition
rule would not be necessary if exchanging similar property did not
result in a realization event.2 6
253 I.R.C.

§ 1001 (1991).

Cottage Sav., 499 U.S. at 562.
255 Id. at 560.
25

256
27
25

Id. at 562-63.
252 U.S. 189 (1920).
Id. at 212.

259 Marr

v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925); Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242
(1924); United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
260 Marr,268 U.S. at 541-42; Phellis, 257 U.S. at 173.
261
262

Weiss, 265 U.S. at 252-54.
Cottage Say., 499 U.S. at 565.

263

Id. at 566.

264

Id.
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A dissent written by Justice Blackmun, and joined by Justice
White, argued that the exchange of mortgages was not material.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board in Memorandum R-49
permitted non-reporting for exchanges of "substantially identical"
266
mortgages.
The memorandum noted that the purpose of the
exchanges was to generate tax losses for savings and loans without
substantially altering the economic situation of the institutions. The
dissent "found it surprising that an agency not responsible for tax
267
matters" would weigh in on the tax consequences of the transaction.
The dissent and the majority agreed the mortgages differed, but the
dissent did not believe that the difference was "material. ' ' 268 The
ruling of the Federal Home Loan Bank269Board held the exchanged
mortgages were "substantially identical.",
Epilogue: 27° In response to Cottage Savings, the Treasury Department
issued proposed regulations under section 1001 that were finalized in
1996. 271 The regulations provide clear guidance, including a number of
examples on when modifications of debt instruments and loans will
tax recognition events.
D. Accrual Accounting - All Events Test Clarified
272

the Court
In United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,
considered whether the "all events" deduction test of section 461 had
been met to allow the taxpayer to deduct expenses related to its
employee medical care plan.27' For an employee to receive a plan
benefit, it was necessary for the employee to file a claim form. The
reimbursement request was then sent to a plan administrator for

Id. at 569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
266 Id. at 557.
267 Id. at 569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
268 Id. at 571 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
265

269
270

Id.
For further discussion of Cottage Savings, see Thomas V. Glynn, Financing

Real Estate Transactions - Current Developments, 55 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED.
TAX'N §§ 13.01, 13.02[1][a][i], at 13-16 (1997); Richard H. Nicholls, Cottage Savings:
More S&L Problems?, 45 TAX LAW. 727 (1992); Loren D. Prescott, Jr., Cottage
Savings Association v. Commissioner: Refining the Concept of Realization, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1991).
271 Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(3)(c) (2005).
272481 U.S. 239 (1987).
273 Id. at 242-43 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1986)).

20051

Tax Decisions Duringthe Rehnquist Court

processing. The Court granted certiorari without an apparent conflict
existing in the circuits.

274

In analyzing the issue, the Court summarily reviewed several of its
prior opinions, most notably its opinion in United States v. Hughes,275
which had been decided in the prior term. 27276 The "all events" test set
out in Treasury Regulations provided that "an expense is deductible
for the taxable year in which all the events have occurred which
determine the fact of the liability and the amount thereof can be
determined with reasonable accuracy., 277 The Court determined that
an employee's incurrence of medical expenses was not the last event
to establish the taxpayer's liability.278 Rather, the last event was the
employee filing a claim for reimbursement; for various reasons, some
employees will not file claims and the taxpayer will not make those
reimbursement payments.279
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens,
dissented. They argued that the obligation to pay valid claims arose
when the medical services were provided. 28° In supporting their
conclusion, they pointed to other instances where the Court would
allow deductions for expenses that might not be paid, including a
taxpayer filing for bankruptcy before paying an accrued debt and a
check not being cashed. 281
Epilogue: 282No legislation or regulations have altered this decision.
E. The Home Office Deduction Denied

In Commissioner v. Soliman,2833 the taxpayer was an
anesthesiologist at three hospitals in the Washington, D.C. area.
274

Id. at 242.

275 476

U.S. 593 (1986).

276Hughes was a Burger Court decision and thus not reviewed
in this article.
278
279
280

GeneralDynamics, 481 U.S. at 243 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1986)).
Id. at 244-45.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 248-49 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

Id. at 249 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
For further discussion of United States v. General Dynamics, see Michael
Dubetz, United States v. General Dynamics: The Deducation of Estimated Liabilities
by Accrual Method Taxpayers: The All Events Test and Economic Performance, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 1439 (1989); and Erik M. Jensen, The Supreme Court and the Timing of
Deductionsfor Accrual-Basis Taxpayers, 22 GA. L. REV. 229 (1988).
283 506 U.S. 168 (1993).
281

488
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None of the hospitals provided him with office space nor did he rent
office space. Instead, the taxpayer used a spare bedroom in his
condominium exclusively as a home-office, although he did not meet
patients there. 284 The Service audited the taxpayer's 1983 income tax
return and disallowed claimed expenses for a section 280A qualified
home office. The Commissioner determined that the home office was
not the taxpayer's principal place of business as required by section
280A(c)(1)(A). 28' A divided Tax Court sustained the deductions and
the Fourth Circuit affirmed, adopting the Tax Court's view that
"where management or administrative activities are essential to the
taxpayer's trade or business and the only available office space is in
the taxpayer's home, the 'home office' can be his 'principal place of
business. ' '' 8

The Supreme Court took the case due to a split in the circuits.287
It reduced the Fourth Circuit's analysis to a simple test: a qualifying
home office may exist "whenever the office is essential to the
taxpayer's business, no alternative office space is available, and the
taxpayer spends a substantial amount of time there." 28& It then
criticized this analysis as supporting a deduction whenever the home
office is the "principal office" of the taxpayer, whereas the statute
refers to the "'principal place' of business."289
The Court then determined that no single objective criterion will
resolve the issue for all taxpayers. Rather, it is necessary to consider
the "facts of each case" using two primary factors: (1) "the relative
importance of the activities performed at each business location and
[(2)] the time spent at each place., 290 The Court rejected the Fourth
Circuit's view that the "necessity of the functions performed at home"
291
has "much weight in determining entitlement to the deduction.,
Epilogue:
2

2

In the Taxpayers Relief Act of 1997, 291 Congress amended

Id. at 170.
§ 280A(c)(1)(A) (1983).

285 I.R.C.

Soliman, 506 U.S. at 171 (quoting Soliman v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 52, 54
(4th Cir. 1991)).
287

Id. at 172.
Id. at 174 (citing Soliman v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 52, 54 (1991)).

289 Id.
290 Id. at

175.

291 Id. at 176.

For further discussion of Soliman, see Lauri K. Aldrich, Rethinking
the Home
Office Deduction, 49 TAX LAW. 383 (1996); see also John E. Byrnes, Casenote,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Soliman: A Decision Wrongly Decided on
292
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section 280(c)(1) to permit a taxpayer a home office deduction even if
the home office is used only for management or administrationrelated activities
as long the business has no other location for that
294
purpose. In effect, the amendment reversed by statute the Court's
holding in Soliman.
F. Who is the Taxpayer?
In Commissioner v. Bollinger,95 the taxpayers sought to deduct
losses incurred in real estate business ventures. 296 Legal title to the
properties was held in the name of a corporation, because the parties
were only able to obtain financing for the ventures at interest rates
that exceeded the state's usury law applicable to non-corporate
borrowers.297 Agreements between the corporation holding legal title
and the individuals memorialized an agency or nominee relationship
between the corporation and the individuals. 298 In the litigation, the
Service argued that the individual taxpayers were not the owners of
the properties that generated the losses. The Tax Court disagreed
with the Service, holding that for tax purposes the individuals were
the owners of the property and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 299 The
Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits
regarding "tax treatment
of corporations purporting to be agents of
3
their shareholders. 00
The issue before the Supreme Court was not one of statutory
construction, but rather one of interpreting old precedent.3 °1 In 1943,
on similar facts, the Court in Moline Propertiesv. Commissioner, held
that a corporation and its sole shareholder were indeed separate
taxpayers and honored the form of the corporation.3 0 Six years later,

"Principal," 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV.429 (1994); Malcolm L. Morris, Suffering
Soliman's Solution, 55 U. Pr. L. REV. 99 (1993).
293 Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788.
294 Id. § 932, 111 Stat. at 881.
295485 U.S. 340 (1988).
296 Id. at 342.
297

Id.

Id. at 343.
299Bollinger v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1443 (1984); Bollinger v.
Commissioner, 807 F.2d 65 (1986).
3W Bollinger, 485 U.S. at 341.
301See Moline Props. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943) and Nat'l Carbide
298

Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
302Moline

Prop. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439-40 (1943).
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National Carbide v. Commissioner set forth a list of factors to

determine whether to attribute tax consequences of a corporate
agent's actions to a principal.03 Bollinger refined the Court's prior
ruling in National Carbide by holding that a bona fide agency
relationship may exist when the parties have a contemporaneous
written agreement, honor the formality of the relationship, and hold
the relationship out to third parties as such.3 °4

Epilogue:30 5 Congress has not modified the Court's holding in
Bollinger.'06 The test remains fact-specific. Taxpayers may protect
themselves from challenges by the Service only by carefully following
the Court's guidelines.
G. Amortizing Intangibles Permitted

In Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. Untied States,3 °7 the taxpayer
purchased another newspaper corporation and subsequently merged
the corporations. Among the assets acquired was an asset described
as "paid subscribers," to which it allocated $67.8 million in tax basis
separately from the goodwill it purchased in the transaction. On its
tax returns, the taxpayer claimed amortization deductions for the
asset.3 °8 In the tax litigation, the Service argued that the "paid
subscribers" asset was essentially goodwill and therefore not subject
to a depreciation deduction. The trial court ruled for the taxpayer,
but the Third Circuit reversed, sustaining the Service's theory.30 9 The
Court granted certiorari "in order to resolve an issue of substantial
importance... and to settle a perceived conflict [among the
circuits]."310

303 Nat'l

305

Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 437 (1949).
Bollinger, 485 U.S. at 349-50.
For further discussion of Bollinger, see BORIS I. BITrKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE,

2.10 at 2-51
(7th ed. 2000); see also Bradley N. Liebmann, Note, Disregarding the Corporate
Nominee: Commissioner v. Bollinger, 42 TAx LAW.371 (1989).
See Mary LaFrance, The Separate Tax Status of Loan-Out Corporations,48
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS

VAND. L. REV. 879 (1995) (discussing Bollinger's importance).
307 507 U.S. 546 (1993).
308Id. at 550.
309 Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555
(3d Cir. 1991).
310 Newark, 507 U.S. 553, n.5 (comparing the lower
court's ruling with Donrey,
Inc. v. United States, 809 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1987); Citizens & Southern Corp. v.
Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463 (1988), affd, 919 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1990)).
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The Supreme Court held that a taxpayer who can prove the useful
life of "customer-based intangibles" may claim depreciation
nature and
deductions for them notwithstanding their ..self-generating
.•
311
To qualify for a
the assumptions regarding their continuation.
goodwill, but that
distinguish
to
it
is
necessary
deduction,
depreciation
312
is a question of fact to be decided on a case by case basis. The real
issues in dealing with customer-based intangibles, according to the
Court, were whether the taxpayer can establish a value and whether
that value declines over time.313 The Court defined "goodwill"
succinctly as "the expectancy of continued patronage, 314 but noted
315
the difficulty of classifying many "customer-based intangibles.,
Nevertheless, taxpayers may, with sufficient evidence, be able to
establish the value and useful life of those assets separate and apart
from goodwill. 3" Four Justices argued in dissent that the taxpayer
could not distinguish its paid subscribers list from goodwill.317
Epilogue: 318 Section 197, enacted in 1993 (the same year that the Court
decided Newark Morning Ledger), provides for a fifteen-year
amortization period for goodwill and other intangibles, including
319
certain types of customer-based intangibles.
VIII. CORPORATE TAXATION CASES

A. Target Acquisition Expenses are Capital
320

In INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, the taxpayer, a publicly
held corporation, was acquired in a friendly, tax-free acquisition. As a
part of evaluating the acquisition proposal, the taxpayer incurred
311 Id. at 558,
312 Id. at 556.
313
314
315
316

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

566.

560.
555.
566.
570.

317 Id. at 571 (Souter, J., dissenting).
318

For further discussion of Newark Morning Ledger, see Michael J. Douglass,

Tangible Results for Intangible Assets: An Analysis of New Code Section 197, 47 TAX
LAW. 713 (1994) (discussing the Court's decision in Newark Morning Ledger and the
impact of section 197) and George L. Middleton & Christian M. McBurney, The
Morning After Newark Morning Ledger: What Should Taxpayers Do Now?, 59 TAX
NOTES 817 (May 10, 1993).
319 I.R.C. § 197.
320 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
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substantial investment banking and legal fees, which it sought to
deduct as ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162.
On audit, the Service contended the expenses were capital in nature
and not currently deductible. 32' The Court granted certiorari based on
a perceived conflict among the circuits.3 2
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the taxpayer relied on a 1971
opinion of the Court, Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan
Ass'n. 323 In that decision, the Court held expenses that create "a

separate and distinct additional asset" for the taxpayer are capital in
nature. 324 In INDOPCO, the taxpayer asserted that Lincoln Savings
stood for the proposition that an expenditure must create a separate
and distinct additional asset to be capital.12' The Court quickly
rejected this interpretation of its prior decision, and then analyzed
INDOPCO's acquisitions expenses under the requirements of section
162, determining they were not "ordinary and necessary" business
326
expenses. The Court also noted that established precedent held that
expenses incurred to change a corporation's structure are not
deductible under section 162, and held that because the expenses in
question were incurred precisely to change the corporation's
structure, no deduction under that section was available. 321
Epilogue: 328 The Court's ruling that INDOPCO's expenses had some
future benefit to the corporation, and thus were capitalized, has not
been altered by Congress.
Nevertheless, the capitalization of
reorganization expenses was not settled until the Treasury
Department issued a regulation. 129 Most notably, the Treasury
Regulation replaced INDOPCO's presumption that such expenses
create capital with a presumption that such expenses are deductible as
321

Id. at 82.

322

Id. at 83.

323

Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. at 354.

324

503 U.S. at 86.

325

INDOPCO,503 U.S. at 86.
Id. at 88.

326

321

Id. at

89-90.

32 For further discussion of INDOPCO, see BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES
S.
EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS

5.04[4], 5.06[2][a], 5.06[2][d] (7th ed. 2000); see also Glenn R. Carrington,
CapitalizationAfter INDOPCO and Into the New Millennium, 93 TAX NOTES 813
(Nov. 5, 2001); Peter L. Faber, INDOPCO: The Still Unsolved Riddle, 47 TAX LAW.
%1

607 (1994).
329

Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-(4), -(5) (2004).
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current expenditures unless they are of a type included on a list of
"capital expenses" included in the regulation.
B. Dischargeof Indebtedness Income for S Corporations
3 31 the taxpayers were shareholders of
In Gitlitz v. Commissioner,
an S corporation. For the tax year in question, the S corporation
realized discharge of indebtedness income, but that amount was not
gross income for the corporation, because discharge of indebtedness
income is not gross income if and to the extent the taxpayer is
insolvent. 3" Notwithstanding the corporate exclusion from gross
income, the shareholders of the S corporation increased their income
tax basis in their stock by the amount of the discharge of indebtedness
income. They relied on section 1366(a)(1)(A), which increases a
shareholder's basis by items of corporate income, asserting that the
statute does not require an item of income to be an item of gross
income to trigger a basis adjustment.333 With the increased basis in
able to deduct losses
their S corporation stock, the taxpayers •were
334
that passed through from the S corporation.
The Commissioner rejected the taxpayers' view of the law and
countered that an exclusion from gross income means that the
discharged income is not an "item of income" to pass through and
The
basis under section 1366. 335
increase shareholders'
Commissioner's argument did not sway the Court, however, which
held that the plain meaning of the statutes involved supported the
336
The Court pointed out that other "items
taxpayers' interpretation.
of income," such as tax-exempt income, are excluded from gross
income yet provide a positive basis adjustment for S corporation
shareholders.337

330

For a discussion of the new Treasury Regulation, see Richard L. Alltizer &

Jeffery J. Bryant, An Analysis of the Final Code Sec. 263(a) Regulations on
Capitalizationof Intangible Assets, TAXES, July 2004, at 39; see also Gary L. Maydew,
New Code Section 263 CapitalizationRegulations Provide Guidance, TAXES, August
2004, at 50; Matthew A. Melone, Final Intangible Asset Regulations Modify and
Clarify, but Conform in Most Respects, to the Proposed Rules, 31 CORP. TAX'N 15
(2004).
331531 U.S. 206 (2001).
332 I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B), (d)(7)(A)(2000).
333 Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 210.
334 Id.
335 Id. at 212.
336 Id.

337 Id. at 212-14.
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Having determined that discharge of indebtedness income that is
exempt from taxation under section 108 may provide a basis
adjustment, the Court addressed a second issue. Section 108(b)
provides that the tax attributes of the S corporation are reduced by
the amount of the discharge of indebtedness income excluded from
gross income under section 108(a).33s The question presented was
whether to reduce the tax attributes before or after the basis-adjusting
"item of income" passes through to the shareholders. The Tenth
Circuit had agreed with the Commissioner that the reduction occurs
before the pass-through.339
The Court quoted the applicable statute, section 108(b)(4)(A),
which "directs that the attributable reductions 'shall be made after the
determination of the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year
of the discharge."' '
The Court's analysis suggested that the plain
meaning of the statute requires S corporation shareholders to adjust
basis to determine their tax liability. 4 ' The Court rejected the Tenth
Circuit's reasoning that allowing an upward adjustment of basis would
somehow prevent the reduction in tax attributes. Instead it
determined that the statute permits both.342 The Court also rejected a
policy argument that taxpayers received the double benefit of an
exclusion from income and an upward adjustment to basis, because
the "Code's plain text" provides for that result.343 Justice Breyer, in
his solo dissent, disagreed with the majority that the statute had such a
clear meaning. He concluded that the statute was ambiguous and thus
could be interpreted as the Commissioner asserted to deny the alleged
double benefit. 344

338The primary tax attribute in question in Gitlitz was the net operating loss

deduction. If the discharge of indebtedness income was first offset by the net
operating loss of the S corporation, no item of income would remain to pass through
to the shareholders. Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 216-17 (citing I.R.C. §§ 108(b)(1), (2),
108(d)(7)(B)).
339The Sixth Circuit in Gaudiano v. Commissioner, 216 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2000),
and the Seventh Circuit in Witzel v. Commissioner, 200 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2000),
agreed with the Tenth Circuit, but the Third Circuit in United States v. Farley, 202
F.3d 198 (2000), agreed with the taxpayer, creating a circuit split.
Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 218 (emphasis in original).
341 Id.
342

Id. at 218-19.

343Id. at 220.

Id. at 220 (Breyer, J. dissenting).

2005]

Tax DecisionsDuring the Rehnquist Court

Epilogue: 345 Congress did not allow the Gitlitz result to stand very
long. In the Jobs Creation and Workers Assistance Act of 2002,

Congress amended section 108(d)(7)(A) to provide that income items
for an S corporation that are excluded under section 108 are not
income items taken into account for the shareholders and there is no
adjustment to basis for the S stock. 34' This change took effect on
October 11, 2001, just nine months after the Court decided Gitlitz. In
effect, the legislation also validated Treasury Regulation section
1.1366-1(a)(2)(viii), which was likely invalidated by Gitlitz, although

that regulation was not mentioned in any of the Court's opinions.
C. Reorganization Boot is Capital Gain
Commissioner v. Clark347 involved the tax treatment of the sole

shareholderS•of 348
a corporation who disposed of his stock in a triangular
reorganization.
The issue was not the qualified status of the
350
reorganization,3 4 ' but rather the characterization of the cash "boot
received by the taxpayer in the exchange. The taxpayer reported the
cash received as capital gain income, but on audit, the Service asserted
35
the money was a dividend taxable at regular income tax rates. '
Competing theories supported each side of the controversy: if the cash
received was deemed to have been paid to the taxpayer just before the

exchange of stock in the reorganization, the money was clearly a
dividend; if deemed paid immediately following the reorganization,
the money was subject to more favorable capital gain taxes. 352

345 For a further discussion of Gitlitz, see Julie F. Bell, Assessing S Corporation

Cancellation of Debt Income on Shareholders' Income and Basis in the S
Corporation's Stock: Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 54 TAX LAW. 671 (2001); see also
Richard M. Lipton, Supreme Court Hands Taxpayers a Victory in Gitlitz, but Will
Congress Take it Away?, 94 J. TAX'N 133 (2001).
346 Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 402,
116 Stat 21, 40.
347 489 U.S. 726 (1989).
348 A triangular reorganization involves the transfer of the stock
of the target
corporation to a controlled subsidiary of the acquiring corporation in exchange for
stock in the acquiring corporation. Sometimes, as in the situation here, the
shareholders of the target corporation will receive cash, or "boot," in addition to
stock in the acquirer.
349 Id. at 732.
350 Clark, 489 U.S. at 732. "Boot" is the common name for
property that is
taxable, but received in a transaction that is in part tax free.
351 Id.
352

Id. at 732-33.
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496

The Tax Court adopted the taxpayer's view.

353

It did not believe

that the cash received should be isolated from the reorganization, as
though the reorganization never happened. It conceded that the cash
payment really did not occur until after the reorganization, but
pointed out that it did occur because of and only because of the
reorganization.354 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the
taxpayer in Clark.355 However, the Fifth Circuit, in Shimberg v. United
States,356 had previously held that cash boot is deemed a prereorganization payment or is calculated as though the reorganization
did not occur. Because of the conflict between the circuit courts, the
Court granted certiorari.357
Twice previously, but many years earlier, the Supreme Court had
considered whether cash received in exchange for stock of a single
corporation was taxable as a dividend. 358 In those decisions, the Court
"agreed with the Government largely because the transactions
involved redemptions of stock by single corporations that did not
'result in a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate
359
interest in the corporation.'
Clark was the third case in which the Government asked the
Court to decide that a shareholder's receipt of a cash payment in
exchange for a portion of his stock was taxable as a dividend. The
different facts of Clark lead to a different result from the previous
two. In Clark, more than one corporation was involved in the
reorganization and the taxpayer did not retain the majority voting
interest he owned before the reorganization - he went from one
hundred percent ownership of the target corporation to owning less
than one percent of the acquirer. 360 The Court concluded that the
transaction had no appearance of a dividend but rather looked like a
sale of stock that is usually taxed as a capital gain.36'
353Clark v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 138 (1986).
354Id. at 150-53, 155.
311Clark v. Commissioner, 828 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1987).
356577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978).
317Clark, 489

U.S. at 737.

358United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970) (involving the redemption of

preferred stock by one shareholder who was deemed to own all of the remaining
outstanding stock of the corporation as a result of attribution rules); Commissioner v.
Bedford's Estate, 325 U.S. 283 (1945) (involving the reorganization of a single
corporation).
319Clark, 489 U.S. at 728 (quoting Davis, 397 U.S. at 313).
360Id. at 731-32.
361 Id. at 744-45.
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Epilogue: 362 The Service, in Revenue Ruling 93-62, 36' announced that
in reorganization matters it would apply the principles of section 302
concerning when redemptions will be treated as exchanges and taxed
as capital gains. Thus, the Revenue Ruling affirmatively adopted the
Court's ruling in Clark. This concession by the government is
favorable for individual taxpayers. However, it is not necessarily good
news for corporate taxpayers, as the dividend-received exclusion of
section 243 is likely to produce a lower tax than capital gains. In the
context of section 306 preferred stock issued in the acquisition, the tax
effect of Clark is more complex, but a consideration of those issues is
beyond the scope of this article.
D. ConsolidatedReturn Loss Carryback

In United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 64 the Court
granted certiorari because of a conflict among the Circuits. 36 ' This
case involved a complicated tax controversy including loss carrybacks
for affiliated corporations filing consolidated returns. It was the first
time the Court had reviewed a consolidated return issue in sixty-seven
years.3 6 The Service proposed requiring each unit of the consolidated
group to compute the loss on a separate basis, while the taxpayer
proposed that an affiliated group should be deemed a single entity for
the computation. The Court, in an opinion that mostly interpreted
Treasury Department Regulations, 367 sided with the taxpayer and
determined that a single-entity method for calculating net operating
losses was correct.3 6 This interpretation permitted a ten-year
carryback of the losses when the consolidated group as a whole had a
consolidated net operating loss deduction. The Court noted that the
Government's own regulations decided the issue and invited the

362 For further discussion of Clark, see BORIS I. BITrKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS

1

12.44[2][c],

12.45[3] (7th ed. 2000).
363 1993-2 C.B. 118.
36

532 U.S. 822 (2001).

365

Id. at 828-29.

366 In

1934, the Court decided three cases involving consolidated returns:
McLaughlin v. Pacific Lumber Co., 293 U.S. 351 (1934); Helvering v. Morgan's Inc.,
293 U.S. 121 (1934); and Charles lfeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62 (1934).
367 In particular, the Court interpreted Treas. Reg. sections 1.1502-12,
-21, and
-79 as they existed between 1983 and 1986. United Dominion, 532 U.S. at 826 n.3.
368 United Dominion, 532 U.S. at 824.
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government to change the regulations if it wanted a different result. 369

Justice Stevens's dissent concluded that the regulations did not
answer the question, and thus, argued that concerns about abuse
should tilt the resolution in favor of the government.37 ° Justice
Thomas, in his concurring opinion, responded to the dissent by
arguing that the tilt should favor the taxpayer when the interpretation
of the regulations is in doubt.37'

Epilogue: 372 It appears that the Service did not use United Dominion
as a catalyst to modify the regulations and reverse the Court's result.
However, the Service has since used the rule of United Dominion to
support a change in the consolidated return regulations to require the
reduction of tax attributes of the entire group when applying the
discharge of indebtedness rules of section 108. 3
E. Stock Surrenderis Not a Loss Recognition Event

In Commissioner v. Fink,374 the taxpayers were controlling
shareholders of a corporation. In an attempt to make the corporation
more attractive to outside investors, the taxpayers surrendered stock
in the corporation, although they retained majority control of the
corporation. On their joint tax return, the taxpayers claimed loss
deductions for the stock surrendered. 375 The Court granted certiorari
because of a conflict among the circuits.

376

The Court analogized the surrender of stock to a contribution to
capital even though a surrender has no effect on the balance sheet of
the corporation. The taxpayers surrendered the stock to protect their
investment in the corporation. In that context, the Court concluded
that it is not possible to determine the amount of the loss sustained as
required by section 165. 377 Moreover, permitting a loss deduction on
369 Id. at 837-38.
370

Id. at 842 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

171

Id. at 838-39 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

37 For further discussions of United Dominion, see Jared H. Gordon, Unbaking

the Consolidated Cake: Deciphering the Impact of United Dominion, 28 J. CORP.
TAX'N 3 (2001), and Christina I. Smith, Note, Challenging the Treasury: United

Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United States, 17 AKRON TAX J. 61 (2002).
173 See T.D. 9192, Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 9192.
374 483 U.S. 89 (1987).
Id. at 91.
Id. at 94.
377 Id. at 97.
'75

376
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these facts might lead to the conversion of future capital losses into
currently deductible ordinary losses. 378 The Court ruled that the
appropriate tax treatment was to increase the basis of shares retained
rather than to allow any current loss deduction.379 The relinquishment
of stock was not deemed the appropriate event to recognize a loss
within the terms of section 1001.380
Epilogue: 381 Congress has not enacted legislation to reverse the result
in Fink.
IX. ESTATE AND GIFT TAX CASES

As evidenced by the discussions above of damages cases and
charitable cases, 382 when a relatively long-term view is taken of the
Supreme Court's tax jurisprudence, one pattern that appears is the
Court's willingness to venture into an area and then fine tune or
provide additional guidance when related issues arise. This pattern
appeared for a third time with disclaimers.
A. Pre-1977DisclaimerConsidered
The Court first ventured into the gift tax aspects of disclaimers in
383
Jewett v. Commissioner, a decision made by the Burger Court, 384
four years before Justice Rehnquist became the Chief Justice. In
Jewett, the Court ruled that a disclaimer of an interest in a trust thirtythree years after the interest was created in 1939 was a taxable gift,
although the interest was still contingent at the time the disclaimer

378

Id. at 98.

379 Id. at 99-100.
380 Id. at
100.
381 For further discussion of Fink, see Gwendolyn Griffith,
Realization and
Recognition of Losses on Stock Surrenders:A Frolic Through Subchapter C, 17 FLA.

ST. U. L. REV. 49 (1989), in which the author explores in detail the policy underlying
the Fink decision and its impact on taxpayers. The author agreed with the Court's
result because no capital left the entity, a prerequisite for a realization event in that
context.

See also BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME

T 3.13[4][a] (7th ed. 2000); Jerald
D. August & Steven J. Levine, Sup. Ct. in Fink Holds Non-ProRata Stock Surrenders
Are CapitalContributions,67 J. TAX'N 130 (1987).
392 See supra Parts V and VI.
383 455 U.S. 305
(1982).
384 Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the
majority, and Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, dissented.
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was signed. The applicable rule for the tax effect of the disclaimer
was contained in a Treasury Regulation, which provided that a
disclaimer effective under local law must be made "within a

reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the transfer."3' 85
The Court granted certiorari in Jewett to resolve the conflict among
the circuits.3 8 In Jewett, the Ninth Circuit ruled for the government,
but earlier the Eighth Circuit had ruled for the taxpayer when
addressing the same issue in Keinath v. Commissioner.87

The Jewett Court began with a statutory analysis and concluded
that the gift tax is sufficiently broad to tax a contingent interest in
property, citing Smith v. Shaughnessy.3"" Moreover, the Court found
that the policy of the gift tax -

supplementing the estate tax -

is

served by taxing disclaimers, because disclaimers have the effect of
39
reducing the size of the disclaimant's potential estate tax liability. 8
Notwithstanding the statutory meaning and the policy of the gift tax,
however, the Court found that the regulation permitted certain
disclaimers to take effect without incurring a gift tax if the disclaimer
(1) was effective under state law, and (2) was made within a
reasonable time of learning of the interest in property.
Thus, the Court set the stage to decide when an interest in
property is transferred to the taxpayer. The Court answered that it
occurred when the contingent interest was created, not at final vesting
of that interest.39 ' Having reached that decision, the Court easily
concluded that the taxpayer had waited too long.
Epilogue:3 93 The Court's decision in Jewett, like the Irvine decision
discussed below, addressed disclaimers under pre-1977 disclaimer
regulations. The precedent of both cases is very limited because
385Treas.

Reg. § 25.2511-1(c)(1) (1981).
U.S. at 308-09.
387 See Jewett v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 93, 95 (9th Cir. 1981); Keinath
v.
Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57, 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
Jewett, 455 U.S. at 309-10 (citing Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943)).
389The Jewett Court favorably cited Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U.S.
39 (1939). Jewett, 455 U.S. at 310.
390 Jewett, 455 U.S. at 310-11.
391 Id. at 318.
392The taxpayer argued that the time to disclaim did not start until he reached
the age of majority, but that was still twenty-four years before the disclaimers and too
long of a delay in the Court's opinion. Id. at 318-19.
193 For further discussion of Jewett, see Don J. Jaret, LR.C.
Section 2518 and the
386Jewett, 455

Law of Disclaimers - An Update, 7 NOVA L.J. 243 (1983).
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section 2518, enacted in 1976, provides statutory rules for qualified
disclaimers.394
B. Pre-1977DisclaimerReconsidered
Twelve years after Jewett, the Rehnquist Court granted certiorari
in its first disclaimer controversy, United States v. Irvine.395 In 1979,
Irvine executed a valid state'% law disclaimer of a 1917 trust interest.
The trust interest was created before Congress enacted the current
gift tax in 1932.39 In Irvine, the Service assessed a gift tax asserting
that the disclaimer was a taxable gift of property and subject to the
gift tax.
The Court accepted the case because of a conflict in the circuits.398
The Court framed the issue as "whether a disclaimer made after the
enactment of the gift tax statute, of an interest created before
enactment, is necessarily free of any consequent federal gift
taxation. ' 99 This was factually different than Jewett, since the trust
interest disclaimed in Jewett was created after the 1932 enactment of
the gift tax, but the trusts in Irvine and Ordway were established
before 1932. The Court's analysis began with Treasury Regulation
section 25.2511 because the disclaimed property interest arose before
the 1976 enactment of section 2518 and its statutory rules for qualified
The Court assumed that the regulation was valid, and
disclaimers.
therefore that if it applied to the disclaimer in dispute the disclaimer
would result in assessment of tax. 40' The regulation provided that a
disclaimer must be made within a "reasonable time" after the
disclaimant learns of the property interest received to avoid gift tax
liability and the Court in Jewett had sustained this rule. 402
The regulation was only a portion of the Court's analysis to

394Under

section 2518, disclaimers made after 1976 must be made within nine
months of the transfer creating the property interest. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2). There is a
minor exception to the nine-month rule for underage donees. See § 2518(b)(2)(B);
Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c) (1997). Section 2518 was inapplicable in Jewett because the
taxpayer executed his disclaimer in 1972, four years before the section's passage.
115 511 U.S. 224 (1994).
396 Minnesota was the applicable
state law.
397See Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, §§ 501-32, 44 Stat. 169, 245-59.
398Irvine, 511 U.S. at 227.
399

Id.

See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
Irvine, 511 U.S. at 234.
402See supra note 390and accompanying text.
401
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determine if the gift tax applied to a disclaimer of a property interest
that arose before the enactment of the gift tax. The Court also
reviewed the policy for the enactment of the gift tax, which was "to
prevent or compensate for avoidance of death taxes by taxing the gifts
of property. 40 3 This policy, the Court thought, reinforced the
regulation's "reasonable time" rule. To permit Mrs. Irvine fortyseven years to disclaim her interest permitted her "a virtually
unlimited opportunity to consider estate planning consequences. '4 4
Next, the Court rejected an attack based on the state law
effectiveness of the disclaimer. Even though, as the Court noted,
states permit disclaimers to bar "the disclaimant's creditors [in this
case the United States Government]... from reaching the disclaimed
property[,]"the goal of state law of allowing disclaimers to defeat
creditors' claims differed from the goals of the federal gift tax of
supplementing the estate tax and preventing estate tax avoidance, and
the Court thought that, in this case at least, state law policies
regulating creditors' interests should not be permitted to defeat
405
In so holding, the Court noted that federal
federal tax regulations.
tax policy is not served by incorporating "state-law fictions as
touchstones of taxability. ''406 Only by the grace of the regulation's
parameters is the taxpayer's disclaimer permitted to defeat the gift
tax.
Finally, the Court concluded that taxing the disclaimer as a gift
did not violate the gift tax enactment transitional rule that transfers
occurring before enactment are not taxed.40 7 A taxpayer may not
escape the gift tax because the property interest existed before the gift
tax was enacted. Thus, although the taxpayer's disclaimed property
interest was created before enactment, the disclaimer and gift taxing
occurred after enactment. The state-law legal fiction that disclaimers
relate back to the time of the original transfer, the Court held, is not
part of federal tax law and does not preclude federal gift taxation of
those disclaimers.

403 Irvine, 511 U.S. at 235 (quoting Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U.S.

39, 44 (1939)).
404 Id.
405Id. at 240.
406

Id.

407 Id. at 241.
408

Id.
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Epilogue: 4°9 The Court's decision in Irvine, like Jewett discussed
above, addressed disclaimers under pre-1977 disclaimer regulations.
The precedential value of both cases is very limited. Nevertheless, the
Court used its reasoning in Jewett and Irvine in its Drye decision
discussed below.
C. DisclaimerDoes Not Defeat Tax Lien
The next disclaimer case the Court considered was Drye v. United
States.410 In a unanimous opinion, the Court ruled that a disclaimer
valid under state law does not defeat a federal tax lien.4 a' Unlike
Jewett and Irvine, Drye is not a gift tax case. Thus, section 2518 is not
controlling and was barely mentioned by the Court, 12 even though it
appears that the taxpayer's disclaimer was likely within the statutory
rules of section 2518. Rather, Drye is a case in which the United
States, as a creditor, sought to levy on a delinquent taxpayer's
property. In Drye, the decedent's son was insolvent and owed taxes.
After the decedent's death, the son disclaimed his interest in his
mother's intestate estate. The disclaimer was valid under Arkansas
state law. As a result, the decedent's estate then passed to the son's
daughter (the decedent's granddaughter) who then funded a
spendthrift trust (valid under state law) for her benefit and for the
benefit of her parents (the decedent's son and his wife). The Service
sought to enforce its lien against the trust by levy on the assets. 3 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the
414
circuits .
The Court started with a review of applicable statutes: the lien
statute is section 6321, the levy statute is section 6331, and there is a
list of exclusions in section 6334. Inheritances are not specifically
included in the list of exceptions from levy. 415 Nevertheless, the
taxpayer asserted that the state law is determinative of whether the
decedent's son had a property interest in his mother's estate. 6 The
40

For further discussion of Irvine, see E. Bruce Jorgensen, Note, Disclaimers of

Interests Created Before Enactment of the Gift Tax: United States v. Irvine, 48 TAx
LAW. 553 (1995).
410 528 U.S. 49 (1999).
411

Id. at 52.

412

Id. at 57; I.R.C. § 2518 (1996).
Drye, 528 U.S. at 53.

413
414

Id. at 55.

415

Id. at 55-57.
Id. at 57.

416
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Court turned to its prior decision in Irvine to conclude that state law
does not determine what an interest in property is for federal tax
purposes. Rather, it ruled that even with a disclaimer of an
inheritance, a taxpayer "inevitably exercises dominion over the
property. ' ' 417 This right of control was a418property interest within the
meaning of section 6321, the lien statute.

Without saying it in so many words, the Court views disclaimers
creatures
of state law that exist primarily to regulate state law
as
debtors and creditors. Disclaimers and their "relation-back" doctrine

are meaningless for federal tax law purposes. It is only when
Congress by section 2518, or the Treasury Department by now
obsolete Regulation 25.2511, decided that a disclaimer may avoid the
imposition of a gift tax does a disclaimer have any federal tax meaning
and then only to the extent specifically permitted.
Epilogue:41 9 There has been no legislative or regulatory response to
Drye.
D. Estate Expenses and the MaritalDeduction
The only other substantive estate or gift tax case considered by
the Rehnquist Court was Commissioner v. Hubert. In Hubert, the

Court reviewed whether the estate tax marital and charitable
deductions are reduced when the estate uses fiduciary accounting

income to pay estate administration expenses. The Court granted
421
certiorari because of a conflict among the ciruits.
411

Id. at 61.

418 Drye, 528
419

U.S. at 61.
For further discussion of Drye, see Steve R. Johnson, The Good, the Bad, and

the Ugly in Post-Drye Tax Lien Analysis, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 415 (2002); Claudia M.
Osorio, Disclaimer of Intestate's Estate Under Arkansas Law Cannot Prevent
Attachment of Federal Tax Lien: Drye v. United States, 53 TAX LAW. 951 (2000);
Edward Kessel, Steven R. Klammer, Supreme Court Finds Disclaimer Ineffective to
Avoid Federal Tax Lien, 92 J. TAx'N 118 (2000).
420 520 U.S. 93 (1997). Besides the disclaimer cases considered in this section,
two of the constitutional cases, Wells Fargo, supra notes 17-30 and accompanying
text, and Carlton, supra notes 45-58 and accompanying text, involved estate and gift
taxes. Also, in United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 (1990), the Court considered a gift
tax statute of limitations question. Justice Kennedy, for the majority, reversed the
circuit court ruling that the doctrine of equitable recoupment did not open the gift tax
statute of limitations. The taxpayer asserted that the same transfer had been income
taxed. Two other Justices joined Justice Stevens in dissent.
421 Id. at 99.
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The Hubert estate incurred substantial administrative expenses,
nearly $2 million. For fiduciary accounting purposes, the estate paid a
portion of the expenses from estate income and a portion from estate
422

principal.
Thereafter, when computing the amount of the estate tax
charitable and marital deductions, the estate did not include in the
deductions any amount of estate principal used to pay the expenses,
but it did not reduce the value of the deductions by the amount of
estate administration expenses paid from estate income. 423 The
Service disagreed, asserting that the deductions were reduced by
estate administration expenses even when paid from fiduciary
accounting income. 424 The Tax Court agreed with the taxpayer and
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 2
The Court began its analysis with the controlling statute, section
2056, but quickly concluded that it did not resolve the issue. The
opinion of the plurality next examined in detail the relevant Treasury
Regulations and ruled that "[t]he Commissioner's position is
inconsistent with the controlling regulations., 426 Three Justices
concurred in result.42' They found neither the Code nor its legislative
history helpful in resolving the question. Unlike the majority, they
found no guidance in the regulations. In concluding their concurring
opinion, these Justices
invited the Treasury Department to issue
428
regulatory gudance.
Epilogue: 419 Subsequent to the Court's opinion in Hubert, the

422Statutory rules for fiduciary accounting are contained in all three versions of
the Uniform Principal and Income Acts promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissions on Uniform State Laws. See UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME AcT, 7B
U.L.A. (1931, 1962, 1997). Most states have adopted one of the three Uniform Acts.
A discussion of fiduciary accounting is beyond the scope of this article.
423Hubert, 520 U.S. at 98-99.
424 Id. at 99.
425Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 101 T.C. 314 (1993), aff'd, 63 F.3d
1083
(11th Cir. 1995).
426Hubert, 520 U.S. at 111. Justice Kennedy wrote the plurality opinion,
joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and Ginsburg.
427Id. at 111 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices Souter and Thomas
joined
Justice O'Connor.
428Id. at 122 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
429For further discussion of Hubert, see Joseph M. Dodge, Lifting
the Shroud

Obscuring Estate of Hubert: The Logic of the Income and Estate Tax Treatment of
Estate Administration Expenses, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 647 (1998); John M. Purcell, Note,
Estate Tax Marital and CharitableDeductions Did Not Have to Be Reduced by PostMortem Income Used to Pay Administration Expenses: Commissioner v. Estate of
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Treasury Department accepted the Court's suggestion to alter the
result in Hubert. Final regulations issued in 1999 provide detailed
rules for the tax treatment of estate administration expenses that are
charged against marital or charitable shares.
X.

CONCLUSION

It is quite surprising the number of times the Supreme Court
considered a substantive tax issue that had already been resolved by

legislation before the Court's opinion or was subsequently resolved by
legislation or administrative action by the Service. This article
observes that this happened more than fifty percent of the time.
The frequent reaction by Congress and Treasury Department to
issues the Court deems significant brings to mind the statement of
Justice Douglas who said:

I protest now what I have repeatedly protested, and that is
the use of this Court to iron out ambiguities in the
Regulations or in the [Code], when the responsible remedy is
either a recasting of the Regulations by Treasury or
presentation of the problem to the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation which is a standing committee of
the Congress that regularly rewrites the [Code] and is much
abler than we are to forecast revenue needs and spot

Hubert, 51 TAx LAW. 451 (1998).
430 Treas.
Reg. §§ 20.2055-3(b)(1)(I),

20.2056(b)-4(d)(1)(I)

(1999).

The

regulations make a distinction between "estate transmission expenses" and "estate
management expenses." Estate management expenses are those expenses that could
have been incurred by the decedent during life or by the beneficiaries, had they
received the property on the date of death without any intervening period of
administration. This includes, for example, costs of maintaining and preserving estate
assets during the estate administration, investment advisory fees, stock brokerage
commissions, custodial fees, and interest. Id. Such expenses may be paid from the
income of a marital or charitable share and deducted for income tax purposes without
a corresponding reduction in the estate tax marital or charitable deduction. The final
regulations clarify that such estate management expenses deducted on the estate tax
return as administration expenses, rather than on the fiduciary income tax return,
reduce the marital or charitable deduction. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-3(b)(3), 20.2056(b)4(d)(3), 20.2056(b)-4(d)(5)(Example 4) (1999). Estate management expenses paid
from a marital or charitable share also reduce the estate tax marital or charitable
deduction, if the expense is attributable to another share of the estate. Treas. Reg.
§§ 20.2055-3(b)(4), 20.2056(b)-4(d)(4), 20.2056(b)-4(d)(5)(Example 3) (1999).
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loopholes where abuses thrive.

The wisdom of Justice Douglas' opinion should not be lost. The
Court is able to review only a limited number of controversies each
year. To have Congress or the Treasury Department "gut" the
Court's effort to resolve a tax controversy means that some other
important issue was not considered by the Court. The present method
of resolving tax controversies is not maximizing the value of limited
resources. Of course, practical problems will arise if the Court does
not resolve disagreements among the circuits because Congress does
not always act to resolve the disputes with legislation. Moreover, you
must wonder if the Supreme Court accepting a tax case energizes
Congress. If this is reality, then the Court is significantly contributing
to the resolution of tax controversies, if for no other reason than its
acceptance of a case signifies that Congress has not resolved an issue
even when the disagreement is widespread. One possible solution
that commentators have suggested is a national tax of court of
appeals. Unfortunately, a detailed discussion of an appellate tax court
is beyond the scope of this article, but maybe it is time to renew those
discussions.432

431
432

United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 114-15 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
One possible solution advocated by other commentators is a national tax

court of appeals. See, e.g., Robert A. Green, Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving
Disputes Between Governments: A Comparison of the International Tax and Trade
Regimes, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 79 (1998); Samuel B. Sterrett, Federal Tax Practicefor
Young Lawyers, FED. B.A. SEC. TAX'N REP. 5 (1995); Margaret L. Thum, Note,
Confusion in the Courts: The Failure to Tax Punitive Damages Uniformly in Personal
Injury Cases, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 591 (1996); Paul E. Treusch, What to Consider
in Choosinga Forum to Resolve an Ordinary Tax Dispute, 55 TAx LAW. 83 (2001).

